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Why a Wall?
Pratheepan Gulasekaram*
Initiated with Operation Gatekeeper in the early 1990s, and extended with significant
funding by the Secure Fences Act in 2006, the United States has committed itself to physical
fortification of its border with Mexico. The stated purpose of the border fence is to eliminate
unlawful entry into the United States. Yet, since the initiation of the border fence project, critics
and empirical researchers have found the fortification, at best, to be costly and ineffectual in
accomplishing its stated goals; at worst, they argue it causes significant death without any
deterrence.
In the face of this critique, this Article theorizes the creation and persistence of a border
wall, arguing that several factors unrelated to actual deterrence inexorably provoke the building of
a physical border barrier. After first describing the powerful cost-benefit case establishing the
disutility of a border fence, the Article explains the underlying forces that render such critiques
unpersuasive. Instead, the Article presents alternative rationales for border wall construction
based on incentives for national lawmakers and the federal government that are only marginally
related to actual elimination of unlawful entry. The Article then highlights the importance of the
wall’s physicality, explaining how its existence alters immigration enforcement and migration
discourse in politically, culturally, and legally significant ways. Fundamentally, the border wall
naturalizes and normalizes the idea of a national border, thereby facilitating harsh enforcement
strategies. Meanwhile, its presence helps generate even more undocumented presence within the
country, rendering the wall not only an apparent solution to a perceived problem, but constitutive
of the problem itself.
Finally, the Article queries whether the existence of the border fence at our current
historical moment portends the weakening of nation-state boundaries. A physical border barrier,
counterintuitively, may be the harbinger of diminished sovereign power, serving more as a warning
to the walled-in citizenry of the constructing nation than to putative migrants on the outside.
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INTRODUCTION
A popular, recent YouTube video documents two young women climbing a
portion of the U.S.-Mexico border fence.1 The clip records the women scaling the
fence in less than eighteen seconds. The obvious point of the video is to mock the
disutility of a border wall, implicitly provoking the watcher to contemplate the
speed and ease with which a young, healthy Mexican or Central American male,
motivated by livelihood and survival, could scale the fence. After detailing the
monetary cost of the fence, text on the screen pointedly asks: “Is it worth the
expense?”
The video provides basic insight into a broader quandary: even if there are
justifiable reasons for attaching legal and social consequences to border
transgressions, what purpose is served by the creation of a surmountable border
fence? It is a question asked not just by young activists with video editing

* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law (J.D., Stanford Law School).
I must thank Professors David Ball, Jennifer Chacón, Kyle Graham, Ellen Kreitzberg, Stephen Lee,
Hiroshi Motomura, David Sloss, and Michael Wishnie for their comments and questions. In addition,
a special thank you to Professor Karthick Ramakrishnan (Political Science, UC Riverside) for allowing
me to present this paper at the Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration Consortium at UC Davis
School of Law. This paper was also presented at the “Persistent Puzzles in Immigration Law”
symposium at UC Irvine Law School; thanks to the participants for their questions and comments.
Finally, thanks to Eric Ruehe (SCU Law 2012) and Chelsea Hopkins (SCU Law 2012) for their
research assistance, and to Dean Donald Polden for his financial support of this project.
1. Rslaz024, 2 Girls Undermine Entire US Border Strategy in Under 18 Seconds, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtgMW8aMl-Q.
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capabilities, but also by social scientists and legal academics in their scholarly
work.
This Article attempts to theorize the existence of a fortified border in the
face of such critique. The conventional case against the border fence, predicated
on evaluating the costs of such a policy against its ineffectiveness as a migration
mitigator, is well established. But, that conventional critique—like the border
fence itself—is apparently ineffectual and unpersuasive. The YouTube video—“2
Girls Undermine Entire U.S. Border Strategy in Under 18 Seconds”—can
“undermine” federal border wall strategy only when the wall is primarily defined
and evaluated by its ability to eliminate unwanted cross-border traffic. Given that
federal law authorizing the fence expressly declares interdiction of unlawful
crossers as its purpose, critics have reason to focus on the fence’s ability to
accomplish that goal. But once we move beyond the policy’s stated justification, it
is not clear that the wall’s ineffectiveness as a migration mitigator renders it
irrational public policy.
Moving beyond this conventional debate raises deeper, more important
questions about border wall policy. The fence may provide significant symbolic
and expressive benefits to politicians and the polity, even though it only provides
marginal deterrence. While theorists have both decried and defended thick
conceptions of nation-state borders,2 current legal commentary on the genesis and
specific effects of a border wall policy, however, remains thin. This Article seeks
to fill that void. It will argue that the purpose, mechanism, and consequence of a
border wall are more intricate and nuanced than the government and supporters
declare, or than commentators credit.
This Article argues that the incentives created by the political, legal, and
social context of border transgression ultimately marginalize rational arguments
against the cost and inefficacy of a fortified border. Once constructed, the
fortified and physical border, in turn, reifies the very political, legal, and social
context that initially gave it life. The physicality and existence of a wall change the
way citizens conceive of immigration enforcement, alter the justifications for
immigration enforcement itself, increase the perception and incidence of unlawful
presence, and naturalize the idea of immigration as an existential threat to U.S.
sovereignty. Thus, the border wall is both a putative solution to a problem and
constitutive of the problem itself. This Article ultimately concludes that this
cyclical reification, which results in ever more stringent legal consequences and
2. Compare Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES 331, 331–49 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (arguing for open borders), and Howard
F. Chang, Cultural Communities in a Global Labor Market: Immigration Restrictions as Residential Segregation,
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 93, 97-120 (2007) (arguing that immigration laws are, from the perspective of
global economic welfare, inefficient), and Kevin Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 197–
203 (2003) (arguing for generally open borders), with MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 39 (1983) (arguing for strong control over national borders
so that internal borders can be open).
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ever more imposing physical structures, in fact undermines the very exercise and
display of sovereignty it is intended to protect.
Accordingly, the border wall presents a complex paradox of immigration law,
border policy, and national power. Part I of this Article begins by describing the
erection of border fortification despite mounting evidence recognizing the
ineffectiveness and human cost of such fortification. Part II follows by presenting
alternative explanations for the border wall’s construction and persistence despite
its high cost and apparent inability to meaningfully deter unlawful migration. Here,
the Article will argue that the legal consequences of migration outside of the law,3
combined with political and psychic need for control, will drive border
fortification despite the pragmatic ineffectiveness of a wall. These claims are
situated within the theoretical and empirical claims of an expressive law
framework, which helps explain how lawmakers can manipulate information
asymmetries between themselves and their constituents to bolster support for
policies like the border wall.
Having presented an alternative narrative for border wall erection—one
divorced from actual interdiction capabilities—Part III details the specific ways in
which a symbolic border wall alters the discourse concerning undocumented
migration and immigration enforcement. Here, the Article will argue that the
existence of a visible border structure domesticizes immigration law by associating
it with property law norms, and naturalizes and entrenches the political, legal, and
social framework that penalizes border transgressions. Finally, Part IV queries the
future of border wall policy. Here, the Article argues that the fundamental irony of
this border is that it prescribes the subsequent policy choices for the federal
government and serves to weaken, rather than strengthen, the long-term
significance of the nation-state boundary.
The ultimate point of this analysis is to explain the contradiction of U.S.
border fortification policy and critique it, not from the perspective of its
purported function, but from the perspective of the other social, legal, and
political purposes it serves. Building upon the work of theorists like Wendy Brown
and Mary Fan, whose excellent and nuanced meditations on the meaning of the
border provide much of this Article’s empirical and conceptual foundation,4 this
Article interrelates different strands of border study across disciplines, situates
political and rhetorical critique of border wall policy within the framework of
expressive law theory, and contemplates the generative and destructive facets of a
physical border fortification strategy.

3. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L REV. 2037, 2038–41 (2008).
4. See WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY (2010); Mary Fan, When
Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short: Fantasy and Fetishes as Gap-Fillers in Border Regulation, 42 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 701 (2008).
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I. THE BORDER WALL’S (IN)EFFECTIVENESS AS MIGRATION MITIGATOR
Increased attention to the national border in general, and the southern
border specifically, is a product of multiple legislative and historic developments.
The southern border is the product of a political compromise negotiated between
the United States and Mexico in the aftermath of the Mexican-American War,
delineated by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and later by the Gadsden
Purchase.5 More recently, several important legislative markers and events,
including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,6 Operation
Gatekeeper, the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994,7 enhanced legal
proscriptions for unlawful presence and entry,8 the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
Secure Fence Act (SFA),9 and the current national economic downturn, all helped
construct and produce the vision and version of the wall we have today. These
developments exerted significant osmotic pressure across the southern border, as
demand for Mexican labor created a steady stream of documented and
undocumented migrants.10 The significance of crossing the border is understood
by, and raises the passion of, people on both sides of the issue through social
context and interaction.11
To suggest that the border is historically, politically, legally, and socially
constructed, however, should not obscure another equally significant truth: the
border can also be physical fact. It is, in many places, a tangible and material
construction, complete with steel, wires, barbs, reinforced posts, cameras, and
security devices. In the past few decades, starting with Operation Gatekeeper12 in
the early 1990s to the passage of the SFA in 2006,13 at great taxpayer cost, the U.S.
government has erected a fortified boundary along a growing portion of its border

5.

See JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE “ILLEGAL ALIEN”
MAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BOUNDARY 193–95 (2002). Although obvious, it bears
mentioning that prior to this political outcome, the states and areas most immediately affected by
unwanted border crossings—Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, and California—were a part of Mexico.
6. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).
8. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)–(7), (9); 1225 (a)–(b) (2006).
9. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (signed into law on October 26,
2006).
10. See NEVINS, supra note 5, at 5–8.
11. See, e.g., Néstor P. Rodríguez, The Social Construction of the U.S.-Mexico Border, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED
STATES 223 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (“Nation-state boundaries are social constructions. They do not
exist independent of our volition.”); Gloria Valencia-Weber & Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Stories in
Mexico and the United States About the Border: The Rhetoric and the Realities, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 241, 242–43, 253–263 (2010).
12. See NEVINS, supra note 5, at 1–3.
13. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 14 U.S.C.).
AND THE
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with Mexico. From Operation Gatekeeper to current initiatives, the federal
government has reshaped the geography of the southern border, literally moving
mountains to make way for a physical border barrier.14 Several state and private
lands have been requisitioned for fence building, and the multiple federal and state
laws that would prevent such construction have been abrogated, preempted, and
disregarded in service of wall construction.
Increasingly, however, many are beginning to doubt that a border wall is a
viable solution to unwanted border crossing. Those who continue to espouse the
virtues of such a strategy are easily caricatured as fringe characters, calling for
militarized and absurd versions of a border wall.15 The Department of Homeland
Security’s border enforcement scheme is more complex, contemplating a number
of strategies, including expanding exclusion and deportation grounds, providing
for expedited removal, beefing up border patrols, increasing worksite
enforcement, exploring high-tech methods of border control, and, of course,
building a border fence. Given these other strategies, questions remain regarding
the necessity and wisdom of using a wall to define and defend those borders.
The SFA states that it is an “[a]ct to establish operational control over the
international land and maritime borders” of the United States.16 A subsequent
provision further clarifies this, defining “operational control” as “the prevention
of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other
unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contra-band.”17
Although it is indisputable that the current fence and increased surveillance tactics
have rerouted human traffic into the United States from Mexico, little evidence
suggests that such traffic has been deterred.18
Sociologists have shown that the decrease in migrant flows since the
renewed federal focus on border fencing and surveillance are better explained by
the economic downturn coincident with these strategies than by border

14. DENISE GILMAN, THE WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BORDER
WALL, OBSTRUCTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE TEXAS-MEXICO BORDER WALL 4–5 (2008); NEVINS,
supra note 5, at 1–5.
15. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Some Cheer Border Fence and Others Ponder Cost, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 19,
2011, at A17 (noting that Representative Michelle Bachmann called for double fencing of the length
of the southern border, and that Republican presidential hopeful Herman Cain called for a twentyfoot high electrified border fence with barbed wire); see also Alex Pareene, Herman Cain Will Veto Bills
Longer than Three Pages, Have Alligators Guard the Border, SALON (June 8, 2011), http://www.salon.com/
news/politics/war_room/2011/06/08/cain_three_pages (quoting Republican presidential hopeful
Herman Cain as promoting a solution akin to the Great Wall of China as part of his immigration
strategy for the United States).
16. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638.
17. Id. § 2(b).
18. CHAD C. HADDAL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33659, BORDER SECURITY:
BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER 26 (2009); Fan, supra note 4, at 702 (“[T]he
fundamental assumption behind the strategy—that raising costs would deter—proved wrong.”).
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enforcement policy.19 Most recent data details the significant decrease in recent
migrant flows since the high point of a few years ago.20 Even though some, like
former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff,
have been quick to credit increased border surveillance and enforcement as the
reason for the decline,21 doing so mistakes correlation for causation. Moreover,
any deterrent effect at the border is likely mitigated by the accompanying
reduction in successful entrants leaving the country.22
Commentators, researchers, government officials, and private actors in
border regions all agree that, at present, the border fence fails to effectively, if at
all, accomplish its interdiction goals.23 Instead, researchers note the significant rise
in migrant deaths with little evidence that migration has been deterred.24 Still
others have noted that even significantly increased border enforcement
strategies—with a border fencing a key component—are unlikely to produce
effective mitigation.25

19. DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & AARON TERRAZAS, IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (2009), available at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=723; Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling
Unwanted Immigration: Lessons from the United States 1993–2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 775,
775–94 (2005); see also HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 14; GORDON HANSON, MIGRATION
POLICY INSTITUTE, THE ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 12 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Hanson-Dec09.pdf; Catherine
Rampell, Illegal Immigration as a Job Market Predictor, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/illegal-immigration-as-a-job-market-predictor/ (citing
Pia Orrenius’s data on apprehensions versus employment trends).
20. Jeffrey Passel & D’Vera Cohn, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration
Flows Are Down Since Mid-Decade (2010), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?
ReportID=126.
21. Rachel L. Swarns, Illegal Border Crossings Dip, and Official Cites Security, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2006, at A20 (“Michael Chertoff announced on Wednesday that tough border security measures . . .
had significantly reduced the number of illegal immigrants entering from Mexico for the first time in
several years.”).
22. Manuela Angelucci, U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration 34–
36 (Institute for Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 1642, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=756408.
23. See, e.g., HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 26–27; BROWN, supra note 4, at 26–27; GILMAN
supra note 14, at 9–11; Fan, supra note 4.
24. Melissa Del Bosque, Migrant Deaths on the Rise Despite Lower Apprehension Numbers, TEXAS
OBSERVER, July 20, 2010, http://www.texasobserver.org/lalinea/migrant-deaths-increase-despitelower-apprehension-numbers?tmpl=component&print=1; MARIA JIMENEZ, HUMANITARIAN CRISIS:
MIGRANT DEATHS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 7–10 (Oct. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/humanitarian-crisis-migrant-deaths-us-mexico-border; Evelyn
Nieves, Illegal Immigrant Death Rate Rises Sharply in Barren Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at A1.
25. See, e.g., STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE HIGH COST
OF CHEAP LABOR: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 8 (2004), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/fiscal.pdf; RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, DEPORTING THE UNDOCUMENTED: A COST ASSESSMENT 8–9 (2005),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/deporting_the_undocumented.pdf; HANSON, supra
note 19, at 12 (“Enforcement during the mid-2000s, which cost $10–$15 billion a year, allowed
500,000 new unauthorized immigrants to enter the country annually. Unless the next $10 billion in
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While Governor of Arizona in 2005, Janet Napolitano, the current Secretary
of Homeland Security, succinctly encapsulated this sentiment when she observed,
“[y]ou show me a 50-foot wall and I’ll show you a 51-foot ladder.”26 Doris
Meissner, former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner,
commented that the negative consequences of the fence outweigh any benefits it
creates for the government and polity.27 Even Governor Rick Perry, the
Republican chief executive of Texas and presidential hopeful, noted that building
a fence to cover the southern border would take significant time and would not be
cost-effective.28 Even if the border fence were extended to cover the entire
southern border, David Martin, the current Principal Deputy General Counsel of
DHS and former INS General Counsel, maintains that smugglers and those intent
on crossing unlawfully would likely find other means of entering the United
States.29 Even interested private actors who care intensely about border security
recognize the futility of a fence. Members of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps,
while participating in privately financed fence building on privately owned land at
the southern border, acknowledge that neither their fence nor the government’s
fence will likely slow or stop cross-border traffic.30
Indeed, in a report to Congress in March 2009, the Congressional Research
Service concluded:
In the limited urban areas where border fencing has been constructed, it
has typically reduced apprehensions. However, there is also strong
indication that fencing, combined with added enforcement, has re-routed
illegal immigrants to other less fortified areas of the border. Additionally,
in the limited areas where fencing has been erected, there have been
numerous breaches of the border fencing and a number of tunnels
enforcement is much more effective than the first $15 billion, it is difficult to see how one could
justify a pure enforcement strategy to address illegal immigration, at least in terms of standard costbenefit analysis.”); Ron Hassner & Jason Wittenberg, Barriers to Entry 2 (June 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://witty.berkeley.edu/Barriers.pdf.
Note also that current estimates indicate that attempting to remove all unlawfully present
persons—heroically assuming such a result is possible—would cost nearly $285 billion over the next
five-year period. MARSHAL FITZ ET AL., CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, THE COSTS OF MASS
DEPORTATION: IMPRACTICAL, EXPENSIVE, AND INEFFECTIVE 14–17 (2010), available at http://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/deportation_cost.html; RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A.
JAEGER, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, DEPORTING THE UNDOCUMENTED: A COST
ASSESSMENT 8–9 (2005), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/deporting_the_
undocumented.pdf (using updated illegal inflow data for 2009 and CBP budget appropriates for
2009).
26. Linda Greenhouse, Legacy of a Fence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/01/22/legacy-of-a-fence.
27. Fan, supra note 4, at 708 (quoting Doris Meissner).
28. Preston, supra note 15 (“Mr. Perry said that building a border-length fence would take ‘10
to 15 years and $30 billion’ and would not be cost-effective.”).
29. David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 101 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 525, 543–44 (2007).
30. Fan, supra note 4, at 712–15.
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discovered crossing underneath the fencing. It stands to reason that even
if border fencing is constructed over a significant portion of the land
border, the incidences of fence breaches and underground tunnels would
increase.31
That same report notes that an “unintended consequence” of the federal
government’s “prevention through deterrence” strategy has been loss of human
life.32 In a fifteen-year span since the creation of the first part of the border fence
in 1990, deaths in the border region have increased nearly 150% as migrants enter
through more remote and rugged terrain.33 This horrific fact underscores the claim
that the cost of the border fence cannot be measured in currency alone.
Further, the piecemeal assemblage of the fence is itself a concession that the
fence cannot realistically eliminate unlawful entry. The first part of the fence,
constructed in 1990 as part of Operation Gatekeeper, spanned fourteen miles
inland from the Pacific Ocean.34 That partial fence clearly had aesthetic and
optical benefits, as it tended to reduce border crossing and apprehensions in the
populated city of San Diego.35 But, it had no meaningful effect on actual
deterrence, as it simply pushed migration further eastward towards the Arizona
border region.36 Ironically, several lawmakers in 2006 pointed to the “success” of
Operation Gatekeeper as the benchmark justifying their support of the SFA.37
Similarly, the current fence, as imagined by the SFA, is destined only to
consist of seven hundred miles of noncontiguous fencing, sporadically spanning
the more than two thousand mile-long border.38 Several open gaps remain for
entry in between these segments of border wall.39 Of course, building across all
two thousand miles of the border would prove extremely costly and difficult given
the geography of the border.40 To the extent one believes that a fence can
eliminate unlawful entry, the only logical explanation of the piecemeal fence is that
31.
32.
33.
34.

HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 26.
Id.
Id. at 33; see also Fan, supra note 4, at 702.
BLAS NUÑEZ-NETO & YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33659, BORDER
SECURITY: BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER 3, 13 (2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33659_20080513.pdf.
35. Id. at 14–17.
36. Id.
37. See 152 CONG. REC. H6541 (2006) (statement of Rep. Edward Royce, R-CA) (discussing
Secure Fence Act); see also Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Statement from Presidential
Campaign Website (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://immigration.procon.org/view.answers.php?
questionID=000778 (“I know fencing helps secure our nation’s borders because criminal activity in
every statistical category has been eliminated or decreased since we built the border fence in San
Diego County.”).
38. See Secure Fence Act of 2006 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103 (1996) (§ 102(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act)).
39. Id.; see HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18.
40. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 15 (quoting Mayor Richard F. Cortez of the border town of
McAllen, Texas, as stating, “[Much of the state border] is a winding river. . . . Where in the world are
you going to put fencing? To propose that suggests ignorance of the border and the terrain”).
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even at its high but still manageable cost, a partial wall will deter and eventually
eliminate migration by raising the risk of border crossing in unfenced areas—over
desert and mountainous terrain—that are harsh and unforgiving.41
Yet, the rise in migrant deaths seriously undermines the claim that border
fence policy could ever work.42 In order for a fortified border to at least marginally
deter unlawful crossing by raising the cost to migrants of unlawful entry—either
because they actually have to pay more in the human trafficking black market or
because they must overcome substantially more obstacles—those costs must have
the desired deterrent effect. Actuarial and sociological evidence, however, suggests
otherwise. That is, knowledge of potential death or even knowing a friend or
relative who has died in an unlawful entry has not stopped other migrants from
undertaking the journey. As Professor Mary Fan puts it, “immigrants are paying
the ultimate price rather than being deterred.”43
Despite this evidence—some of it generated by the federal government
itself—fence building has waxed in recent years, not waned. In addition, the costs
of border wall construction and maintenance continue to rise.44 Estimates vary,
but figures from the U.S. government put the initial construction cost of a wall at
two to four million dollars per mile.45 Others note that such estimates, usually
from governmental agencies, exclude many costs.46 Accounting for excluded costs
and long-term costs after initial construction, some estimate that the fence at the
southern border costs between three million and twenty-one million dollars per
mile.47 The federal government details that in fiscal year 2008, $196 million were
appropriated for fence construction.48 Including maintenance and rebuilding costs
over twenty-five years, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers predicted that the
41. NUÑEZ-NETO & KIM, supra note 34, at 1–5.
42. Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: The Efficacy and “Unintended” Consequences of U.S.
Immigration Control Policy 1993–2000, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661, 677–81 (2001) [hereinafter
Cornelius, Death at the Border ] (“There is as yet no evidence from high-emigration communities in
Mexico that appreciable numbers of potential first-time unauthorized migrants are delaying or
abandoning their plans to migrate.”); see also JIMENEZ, supra note 24, at 7–10; Wayne A. Cornelius,
Impacts of Border Enforcement on Unauthorized Mexican Migration to the United States, BORDER BATTLES
(Sept. 26, 2006), http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Cornelius [hereinafter Cornelius, Impacts of Border
Enforcement].
43. Fan, supra note 4, at 703.
44. NUÑEZ-NETO & KIM, supra note 34.
45. HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 18–19; GILMAN, supra note 14, at 12.
46. BROWN, supra note 4, at 37 (“The cost of the wall is difficult to establish. Much federal
expenditure of bureaucratic and manual labor related to planning, building, maintaining, and analyzing
the effectiveness of the wall is excluded from calculations.”); Preston, supra note 15 (“[S]ecurity
analysts say very little research is available on how much a border-length fence would cost . . . . Based
on what studies do exist, the analysts say that building and maintaining a fence . . . would run into
billions dollars, with no documented impact on diminishing illegal crossings.”).
47. BROWN, supra note 4, at 37; Preston, supra note 15 (“In 2009, the Congressional Research
Service reported that the [DHS] had spent roughly up to $21 million per mile to build a primary fence
near San Diego.”).
48. HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 18–19.
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fortified border could cost up to seventy million dollars per mile to maintain.49
Since the SFA, which provided for the creation of major portions of the border
fence, roughly $2.4 billion has been allocated to complete approximately 670 miles
of fencing.50 Even this large number, however, fails to capture the several fixes,
mistakes, and routine maintenance costs that will drive expenditure over the life of
the fortification.51
More recently, the President announced that his administration was
abandoning a project, green-lighted by the prior administration in 2006, to
supplement the physical fence with virtual fence technology.52 But, before
discontinuation, that project already accrued expenses over one billion dollars.53
As a useful comparison for all these figures, the entire annual budget for the
enforcement arms of the DHS is fifteen billion dollars.54 In real terms then, the
cost of border fortification is not trivial or de minimis and becomes a recurring
expense over time.
In addition to these monetary costs, fencing has increased migrant death toll,
and has produced other unintended consequences as well. Recent years have
witnessed the cartelization and consolidation of narcotics and human trafficking,
with the going extortion rate of human smuggling skyrocketing from
approximately five hundred dollars in 1986 to nearly three thousand dollars in
2008.55 This cost increase has intensified people-smuggling enterprises, as well as
dangerous living and work conditions in the United States.56
While all this evidence strongly supports discontinuing border wall policy,
such a strategy remains popular and persists. Parts II and III, below, query reasons

49. NUÑEZ-NETO & KIM, supra note 34.
50. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-244R, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE
FENCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS 4 (Jan. 29, 2009), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d09244r.pdf.
51. Preston, supra note 15 (“These estimates do not include the costs of acquiring land, nor
the expense of maintaining a fence that is exposed to constant efforts by illegal crossers to bore
through it or under it or to bring it down.”).
52. Jeremy Pelofsky, U.S. Ends “Virtual Fence” Project on Mexico Border, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 2011,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/14/us-usa-security-fence-idUSTRE70D4KN20110114
(“The project, begun in 2006 and run by Boeing Co., has cost about $1 billion and was designed to
pull together video cameras, radar, sensors and other technologies to catch illegal immigrants and
smugglers trying to cross the porous border.”).
53. Id.
54. HANSON, supra note 19, at 12; Budget of the United States Government: Detailed Functional Tables
FY 2010, GPO ACCESS (Sept. 24, 2011), www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/fct.html (detailing $5.5
billion budget for Customs & Border Patrol, and a $9.4 billion dollar budget for Immigration &
Customs Enforcement).
55. Ronald Campbell, “Cynical” Policy Tacitly Encourages Illegal Immigration, ORANGE CNTY.
REGISTER, Nov. 9, 2011, http://m.ocregister.com/news/-266490--.html; see also Wayne Cornelius,
Controlling Unauthorized Immigration from Mexico: The Failure of Prevention Through Deterrence and the Need for
Comprehensive Reform 6, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, June 10, 2008, available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/CCISbriefing061008.pdf.
56. See Cornelius, Impacts of Border Enforcement, supra note 42.
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for this phenomenon and provide alternative narratives that explain border
fortification regardless of efficacy.
II. WHY BUILD WALLS?
Thus far, the rational public policy case seeking to calibrate costs and
purported benefits of a border fence has not persuaded lawmakers to abandon
physical border fortification as a migration control strategy. In America, as well as
globally, the trend towards construction continues. The trend actually appears to
be accelerating with over three-quarters of existing border walls built after 2000.57
Political scientist Wendy Brown, in her groundbreaking assessment of
nation-state wall-building, notes that all walls built in the last two decades are very
expensive, and “do not work” in the sense that they do not stop unwanted
migrants.58 Yet, she also notes that these walls enjoy popular support.59 The
acceleration and popularity of border fortification, both globally and domestically,
raises the question of why wall building and border fortification continue. Here,
the Article proposes some possible answers to this puzzle. First, the political
incentives to construct border fortifications weigh in favor of national lawmakers
authorizing a fence. Second, the citizenry’s longing for national government
omnipotence over migration and security concerns persuade the polity and
organized private actors that fence building is a necessary government solution.
Relatedly, the background legal consequences of border transgression, increasingly
punitive towards unlawful entry and presence, inevitably manifest in tangible
border fortification. Finally, a border wall solidifies federal immigration power visà-vis the several states. These factors suggest that a wall’s inability to actually
interdict and stop migrants is of limited relevance in decisions to continue border
building.
A. Incentives for the Secure Fence Act and Border Fortification
The simplest explanation as to why walls are popular public policy concerns
the political benefits of such legislation to national lawmakers. It is not revelatory
to argue that politicians can mollify constituencies when they promise to get
“tough on immigration” or “enforce the border.”60 And, as some political
57. Hassner & Wittenberg, supra note 25, at 22 (“Three-quarters of contemporary barriers
were built in or after the year 2000.”).
58. BROWN, supra note 4, at 27 (“All [walls] generate significant effects in excess of or even
counter to their stated purposes; none really ‘work’ in the sense of resolving or even substantially
reducing the conflicts, hostilities, or traffic at which they officially aim.”).
59. Id. (“[E]ach is expensive, yet strikingly popular.”).
60. See Michael Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the
Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 55–56 (2007) (“Congress . . . tried to enact
severe measures, which in the anti-immigrant climate, could pass because no elected official wants to
be painted as ‘soft on immigration crime.’ Were I in office, I would not want to be perceived as weak
on such a fundamental issue.”). Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s poll numbers in the Republican
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scientists have argued, legislative outcomes at the local and state level that are
antagonistic towards immigrants and undocumented aliens are better explained by
partisanship than by demographic factors frequently cited by elected officials and
scholars.61 Nevertheless, dissecting voting patterns for the border fence at the
national level usefully sheds light on one reason the conventional cost-benefit
analysis fails to persuade lawmakers. Further, it provides yet another example of
the political efficacy of outwardly tough, but ultimately ineffective, immigration
and border policy.
Examining congressional voting on SFA reveals the notable fact that interior,
nonborder states with extremely low immigrant (both documented and
undocumented) populations most enthusiastically supported the border fence
policy. The border with Mexico encounters, and runs through, only four states:
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Like the Congress generally, a
majority of congressional members in those four states combined voted in favor
of the SFA, as the bill passed 283–138 in the House and 80–19 in the Senate.62
However, California, Arizona, and Texas also produced a majority of the nay
votes on the SFA. In fact, a substantial majority of California representatives
voted against the bill.63
In contrast, the House members of seventeen states voted unanimously to
pass the law.64 Of those seventeen states, thirteen also had unanimous votes by
their senators in favor of the bill.65 A cartographic examination of those states

Gubernatorial Primary rose from twenty-six percent to forty-five percent in one month after signing
Arizona’s SB 1070 into law. AZ Gov. Jan Brewer Surges in Popularity, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, available at
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/elections/election_2010/election_2010_
governor_elections/arizona/election_2010_arizona_republican_primary_for_governor.
61. S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom K. Wong, Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal
Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY
ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 73 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2010)
(arguing that demographic factors poorly explain the emergence of subnational immigration
regulation; instead, partisanship offers a more complete and empirically supportable explanation).
62. GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2006-446 (last visited
January 24, 2012).
63. Thirty-one representatives from California voted nay; twenty-two voted aye. In addition,
Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York also
produced significant nay votes.
64. States with all House members voting aye on H.R. 6061: AL, DE, ID, IA, KS, KY, MT,
NE, NV, NH, ND, OK, SD, TN, UT, WV, WY; see GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2006-446 (last visited January 24, 2012). The House voted 283-138 to pass
the bill, with 10 members not voting, and 212 votes needed to pass.
65. States with all Senate and House members voting aye on H.R. 6061: AL, IA, KS, KY, MT,
NE, NH, ND, OK, TN, UT, WV, WY; see GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
vote.xpd?vote=s2006-262 (last visited January 24, 2012). The Senate voted 80-19 to pass the bill with
one member not voting.
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reveals that eleven of them are located within the heartland of the United States,
overlapping neither an international nor maritime border.66
Perhaps more important than the location of those states strongly supporting
fencing at the national border, all states producing unanimous votes have
extremely low immigrant populations, both lawfully and unlawfully present. In
terms of total foreign-born, all of these states—with the exception of Tennessee,
which ranked twenty-fourth in 2007—are in the bottom half of states nationwide,
with the majority in the bottom third.67 Focusing solely on the undocumented
immigrant population, these states also experience low estimated undocumented
immigrant populations, and low (with the exception of Nevada) shares of
unauthorized immigrants in the labor force.68
Comparing voting on the SFA to the actual presence of immigrants and
undocumented immigrants—and even to undocumented presence in the work
force—suggests that lawmakers and constituencies most likely to support border
fortification policies are exactly those who have the least contact with immigrants,
whether lawfully or unlawfully present.
A national border wall then, is likely not responsive to a particular public
policy problem faced by the lawmakers’ constituents in those states.69 Further, it
suggests that it is unlikely that those lawmakers must account for any meaningful
political check from immigrant and immigrant-friendly constituencies.70 For these
policymakers, voting to build walls at the border creates only political gains
without having to deal with the human life, labor force, social, or law enforcement
costs of unlawful migration. They accrue concentrated benefits by supporting
popular legislation for their constituencies, while enjoying the benefit of diffuse
costs—because spending comes from the federal budget mediated by DHS—or
borne overwhelmingly by other states with higher immigrant populations.
It is precisely these perverse political, social, and monetary incentives that
spurred the mayor of Eagle Pass, Texas—a border town—to oppose the border
fence and poignantly suggest that states and localities in the interior of the nation

66. Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Alabama, with only a fraction of its border abutting
the Gulf of Mexico, was excluded from this list, although it could easily be considered as a part of it.
67. MIGRATION POLICY INST., Number of Foreign Born by State (1990, 2000, and 2009), available
at http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/acscensus.cfm. Other than Tennessee (24) and
Utah (26), in 2007 (the year after passage of the SFA), all other unanimous voting states were ranked
between 30th and 50th in the nation by number of foreign born (e.g., OK–30th, IA–35th, KY–36th,
NE–38th, MT–47th, ND–50th).
68. Jeffrey Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply Since
Mid-Decade 15, Table A2 (Pew Hispanic Center Research Report, 2010).
69. Cf. Ramakrishnan & Wong, supra note 61 (arguing that subfederal immigration regulations
do not necessarily respond to particular and unique public policy challenges).
70. See, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, Immigration Reform: Tricky Political Tightrope in Tallahassee, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/14/2167855/immigration-reformtricky-political.html.
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wall-in their own jurisdictions if they felt that the threat of Mexican migration was
an actual problem.71 While his critique pointedly puts the onus on jurisdictions
with few immigrants to take a realistic view of unlawful migration and border
policy, the fact that nonborder jurisdictions support the border fence is some
evidence that the empirical realities of border fortification and its consequences
matter little in influencing political outcomes. Thus, congressional voting on the
SFA provides at least one important example of national lawmakers supporting
strong border policy and tough immigration regulation because they can do so
without expending significant political capital.
Notably, once legislated and erected, the border wall is unlike other
enforcement strategies. It becomes physical fact, an unmoving feature of the
geopolitical landscape.72 While any legislation, once passed, generates its own
inertia and is difficult to subsequently overturn, the wall’s physicality makes it
particularly sticky public policy.73 Abandoning the border fortification policy
requires genuine labor in deconstructing the wall, at high public cost.
Undoubtedly, should the cost of dismantling prove too much, the
government could instead decide to simply leave the wall in state of disrepair. This
possibility, however, would exact a high symbolic and expressive toll from the
federal government. Like a rusted and broken fence outside of a city park, or an
abandoned house with a rotting exterior, the slowly degrading border wall would
become a visible, permanent testament to failed national policy and wasted public
funds. Avoiding this potentiality itself incentivizes wall maintenance regardless of
its utility.
B. Fortifying the Federal Government Through Border Fortification
In addition to the political benefits to national lawmakers of an ostensibly
tough border policy, the border fence responds to, and is made necessary by,
Congress’s prior legal construction of the border, the public’s desire that the
federal government do something to address a perceived crisis in unlawful
migration, and the Supreme Court’s conception of national immigration power
vis-à-vis the states. Here, the Article argues that the current background statutory
framework, which penalizes unlawful entry and presence, combined with renewed

71. Fighting the Fence: Texans and Owls Take On the Federal Government, THE ECONOMIST, June
12, 2008 (“‘There’s a misconception in mid-America that Mexico is overrunning the borders,’ says
Mr. Foster. He suggests that the rest of America fence their own communities if they feel insecure.”);
see also Texas Mayors Oppose Plan for Border Fence, NPR (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=15315131.
72. BROWN, supra note 4, at 27 (“[E]ach [wall] is built as provisional while taking shape as
permanent . . . .”).
73. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Timur Kuran, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 743 (1999) (arguing that once policies based on misinformation are enacted and stabilized,
they may endure by influencing future generations who will carry on the distortions that led to the
creation of the initial policy).
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government focus on interior enforcement, create conditions that make a border
fence an ideal and logical complement to a robust statutory and enforcement
scheme. Second, the border wall’s physicality allows federal lawmakers to mollify
the citizenry’s desire for ostensibly security-enhancing public policy. Finally, a wall
reifies federal power over immigration matters by serving as a tangible reminder of
the primacy and necessity of national immigration control.
1. Complementing the Legal Consequences of Unlawful Migration
Even prior to the passage of the SFA, the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) already attached significant legal consequence to border transgressions.74
Congress and the DHS legally constructed the border through prohibitions and
consequences for unlawful presence and entry without inspection. In addition, the
DHS expanded the definition of the border zone, allowing expedited removal
proceedings not just for those caught at a port of entry or at the actual border, but
also for those found within one hundred miles of a U.S. land or maritime border.75
Repeat unlawful entries carry significant penalties.76 Additionally, the INA, along
with the U.S. Criminal Code, provides wide berth to prosecute those who, while
not terrorists themselves, may have materially supported organizations related to
ones that engage in terrorism.77 Further, as Professor Ayelet Shachar notes, in
legal terms, Congress has expanded and redefined the “border,” both internally
within the nation and internationally, in order to provide greater flexibility and
leeway in interdicting unlawful entrants and putative national security risks.78
Yet, these powerful legal tools, the true brawn of a muscular border policy,
are all invisible; even as they allow enforcement reach well within and outside the
national boundary, and include criminal penalties, they exist primarily in statute
books and administrative proceedings. As such, they lack the visceral power of a
fence.79 Thus, even as the Obama Administration steps up enforcement efforts
and removes more aliens than any prior administration,80 his administration is
74. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182; 1321–30.
75. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004). The
American Civil Liberties Union calls this 100-mile zone a “Constitution-Free” zone.
76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (criminalizing “material support for terrorism”); see Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
78. Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 809, 811,
837 (2009) (“This shifting border of immigration regulation . . . is selectively utilized by national immigration
regulators to regain control over their crucial realm of responsibility, to determine who to permit to
enter, who to remove, and who to keep at bay.”) (emphasis in original).
79. Marc Lacey, Arizona Officials, Fed Up with U.S. Efforts, Seek Donations to Build Border Fence,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/20border.html (discussing
Arizona’s solicitation of private donations to build a fence on state and private land, and quoting State
Senator Steve Smith as stating, “[A fence] is a tangible, legitimate structure people can see, taste and
feel”).
80. Peter Slevin, Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Increases Under Obama Administration, WASH.
POST (Jul. 26, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/25/
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perceived as soft on immigration.81 Without border fortification, the border as a
social and legal construct lacks emotive force.
The most expeditious way to make the statutory border developments salient
is to couple them with a fence.82 Whereas the citizenry at large may not
comprehend the complexities of the unlawful entry provisions or the three-year,
ten-year, and lifetime bars to admissibility in the INA,83 the fence is a
straightforwardly understood symbol that the United States is resolved to stop the
foreign invasion from the global south.84 Unlike legal proscriptions, with a fence
administrative officials need not discuss how the various sanctions in immigration
law will eventually deter unlawful presence or make putative migrants reconsider
border crossing. Regardless of its actual effect, a border wall appears selfexplanatory.
2. Border Wall as Security Blanket
Prior to 9/11, the creation of walls and fences was not popular amongst
lawmakers,85 and other than a cosmetic fourteen-mile fence, the border was not
physically fortified. The events of 9/11 drastically altered the immigration
debate,86 and inexplicably focused attention on the southern border of the United
AR2010072501790.html (reporting that Obama administration is deporting “record numbers” of
immigrants).
81. Julian Aguilar, Alien Removals Increase Under Obama, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Aug. 8, 2010),
http://www.texastribune.org/immigration-in-texas/immigration/alien-removals-increase-underobama (“Not only has the Department of Homeland Security referred more immigrant-related cases
for prosecution under President Obama than under his predecessor, but it has also removed more
aliens than the Bush Administration did, even in its busiest year.”); Andrew Becker, Tension over Obama
Policies Within Immigration and Customs Enforcement, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/26/AR2010082606561.html; Eve
Conant, Obama Is Not Soft on Immigration, NEWSWEEK (Jul. 31, 2010) (interview with Janet
Napolitano), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/31/obama-is-not-soft-on-immigration.html.
82. Fan, supra note 4, at 711 (“[T]he more the prevention-through-deterrence paradigm has
become strained by proof of its inefficacy, the more object-oriented it has become: more layers of
triple fencing, more sophisticated military equipment such as remote sensors and unmanned
aircraft.”).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)–(C) (providing for three-year, ten-year, and lifetime
inadmissibility bars for aliens with prior immigration violations or who are unlawfully present).
84. Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the Production of Migrant
Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 23, 26 (2009) (“Such insistent inadequacy to the task of preventing
unauthorized border crossing means that the fence is primarily a symbol to the citizenry, our southern
neighbor, and the world, that America is resolved to stem the tide of those who ‘invade’ our labor
markets.”).
85. Thomas Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the Door: Mobility, Adjustment, and the
Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 360 (2007) (“By the time of the Fox-Bush summit
in early 2001, the opposition of U.S. workers to Porous or Open Borders was increasingly seen as
anachronistic. Talk of fences along the border did not sit well with either U.S. business interests or
liberals. . . . But reports of the death of borders were greatly exaggerated. The September 11th
terrorist attacks suddenly made Open Borders and Porous Borders seem irresponsible, decadent, and
dangerous.”) (emphasis added).
86. Johnson, supra note 2, at 202–03.
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States as a potential entry point for terrorist threats. The empirical dubiousness of
the terrorism/immigration association aside, the focus on the southern border
meant that migrants from Mexico and Central America would be constructed in
the American imagination as threats to the nation’s rule-of-law ideals, its economic
security, and its national security.87
Already capturing the consciousness of states like California since the 1980’s
and 1990’s,88 in more recent years, elected officials and issue activists have
increased their focus on the southern border. In 2008, then-Representative Tom
Tancredo’s platform while seeking the Republican nomination for President
primarily focused on controlling the U.S. southern border and stopping unlawful
immigration.89 Meanwhile, for many of the last years of his syndicated—and
popular—news commentary show on CNN, Lou Dobbs nightly enflamed the
passions of his viewers on the topic of immigration, sometimes making misleading
and false claims when taking strongly restrictionist perspectives.90 More recently,
Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona gained national notoriety while increasing her instate popularity, by signing the controversial Senate Bill 1070 state immigration
enforcement law. Anti-immigration ideologues harp on the fact that the 9/11
attackers were migrants, who remained in the country after overstaying their
student visas.91 These and other public figures have ridden a wave of public
consciousness and concern that increased migration presents a threat to economic
well-being and national security.
This perceived crisis of unlawful migration, colored by the post-9/11

87. The notion of the border as a source of conflict, with the image of the Mexican migrant—
or the migrant crossing from Mexico—as the lawbreaking, job-stealing, potential security threat is a
relatively recent version of the border. See Danieljbmitchell, Wilson’s Re-Election Ads on Illegal
Immigration, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0f1PE8Kzng. The U.S.
southern perimeter was not always viewed as a stage for policymakers or the citizenry to clash with
economic migrants from Mexico and Central America. Scholars note that early twentieth-century
border policy emphasized the potential cooperation and overlapping interests that the United States
and Mexico shared. Valencia-Weber & Lopez, supra note 11, at 266–73. The federal government’s
major concern was uninspected entry of non-Mexicans such as the Japanese and Chinese who were
perceived as alien beyond recognition and repair. Id.; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those
belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. . . . I allude to the Chinese race.”)
88. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (evaluating California law that imposed sanctions on
hiring of unlawfully present workers); Cal. Proposition 187 (1994) (state law imposing substantial
restrictions on public assistance and public-funded programs for undocumented immigrants in
California).
89. Jeff Zeleny, Tancredo’s Platform: Immigration, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (April 2, 2007 10:59 AM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/tancredos-platform-immigration/ (“His platform?
Illegal immigration. Period.”).
90. See e.g., David Leonhardt, Truth, Fiction and Lou Dobbs, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at C1.
91. See The Role of Technology in Preventing the Entry of Terrorists into the United States: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, & Government Information of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States
Senate, 107th Cong. 54 (2001) (statement of Steven Camarota, Director of Research, Center for
Immigration Studies).
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conflation of terrorism and immigration, spurs public demand that lawmakers do
anything to address existential threats to national sovereignty. A border wall
satiates these critical needs. The wall at the nation’s border, like the walls of a
house or the fence at the edge of a front yard, gives comfort; it mollifies the
citizenry by fulfilling the desire to believe, in the face of a perceived existential
threat, that the government is an omnipotent caretaker. It allows the citizenry to
believe that the demographic makeup and cultural mores of the community in
which they live will be preserved untouched despite significant upheavals in the
global economic landscape. Belief in the federal government as omniscient
protector, Professor Fan writes, allows the citizenry to cope with the harsh truth
that the forces compelling migration are beyond the reach of individual nationstates, and that unwanted migration, in all likelihood, cannot realistically be
eliminated.92
What makes this fantasy of governmental action so seductive is that it does
not depend on wholesale obfuscation of the practical disutility of border
fortification. Rather, even if some of the citizenry remained aware of the wall’s
ineffectiveness as a migration mitigator, the fence allows them to disconnect
reality from imagined possibility; they can indulge the innately human desire to
engage in fantastical possibility rather than the disappointing actuality.93
Further, the fence ties into different conceptions of security—terrorismrelated national security, labor-related economic security, and demography-related
cultural security—while addressing unlawful migration systemically and without
prejudice. The legal consequences of unlawful entry and statutory re-entry bars,
conversely, can only be applied against one individual alien at a time through
judicial, or quasi-judicial, proceedings. Their power to affect migration is limited
either to the specific individual or diffusely through deterrent effects on putative
migrants. The wall, by contrast, magnifies and depersonalizes the legal effect,
ostensibly providing a systemic remedy to the same problem.
Although the focus on the southern border with Mexico renders the national
security rationale suspect,94 the actual existence of a terror threat is, from the
92. Fan, supra note 4, at 703–04 (“People from divergent perspectives vigorously critique the
state and its policies, see and live the gap between law and policy’s promises and reality, but the very
critique regenerates desire for the omniscient power of the government and the law to fix things
somehow, if only. . . . [Government’s] function is to comfort society and develop the structure of an
elaborate dream world where logic creates justice.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
93. Id. at 726 (“The person clinging to a fetish is fully aware of a traumatic truth, can discuss it
rationally, but clings to the fetish as the embodiment of a disavowal of the traumatic reality.”).
94. BROWN, supra note 4, at 69 (“[Even the] border [wall] can have little or no effect on . . .
biological and nuclear weapons or hijacked airplanes.”); GILMAN, supra note 14, at 9–10
(“[G]overnment officials have provided no evidence that terrorists are using the Texas/Mexico
border to enter the United States. . . . If terrorists were to attempt to cross a land border illegally to
enter the United States, it is more likely they would cross into the United States from Canada, since
there are fewer controls on the Canadian Border.”); David Spiro, Criminalizing Immigration: The Social
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perspective of border fortification, only marginally relevant. We—as the citizenry
and policymakers—create meaning and ascribe importance to the border through
our political and cultural interaction.95 Stoked by lawmakers and media
personalities, the blurring between terrorism and immigration in the public’s
mind96 creates the need for Congress to “do something”—anything—to mollify
the perceived threat.97 As Professors Cass Sunstein and Timur Kuran have shown,
the reputational consequences for lawmakers of doing nothing on high-profile
issues virtually ensures action, even when objective and empirical evidence
suggests that such action is unnecessary or ineffective.98
This atavistic desire on behalf of a significant part of the citizenry to have
their public officials address migration is evidenced by the recent, exponential rise
in subnational immigration regulations.99 Attempts to restrict residential leasing
and businesses licenses, combined with increased local involvement in
immigration enforcement, fundamentally express the citizenry’s urge to feel secure
in their neighborhoods and communities. Yet, very few, if any, of these
regulations correspond to an actual public policy concern.100 Regardless, local
lawmakers and targeted advocacy groups are able to capitalize on nebulous and
unsubstantiated fears about cultural dilution and dissolution of prior community
dynamics101 to pass legislation that can be economically crippling to the
jurisdiction.102 Moreover, these subnational regulations enjoy dubious
constitutional existence, surviving for the moment despite serious concerns
Construction of Borders and National Security, INT’L STUD. ASS’N WORKING PAPERS, Feb. 20, 2010, at 17
(“The physical changes and militarization of the US border with Mexico were not accompanied by
similar efforts on the US border with Canada, which calls into question some of the reasoning of
national security.”).
95. Michiel Baud & Willem van Schendel, Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands, 8 J.
WORLD HIST. 211, 211 (1997) (“Although [national borders] appear on maps in deceptively precise
forms, they reflect, at least initially, merely the mental images of politicians, lawyers, and
intellectuals.”); Spiro, supra note 94, at 7.
96. BROWN, supra note 4, at 69 (“If open borders are (falsely) held responsible for growing
refugee and immigrant populations and border fortifications are (falsely) imagined capable of
stemming this tide, porous borders are also commonly figured as the scrim through which terror
slips.”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575 (2002) (discussing the disidentification of Arab or Muslim persons as citizens, and their racialization as terrorists).
97. Morales, supra note 84, at 46 (“Congress constantly overreaches . . . because We the
People are sovereign and demand that our representatives do something about the problems of the day.
The Secure Fence Act, if nothing else, telegraphed congressional concern to constituents.”).
98. Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73, at 687–89, 701.
99. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State Laws Related to Immigration
and Immigrants, available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19897.
100. Ramakrishnan & Wong, supra note 61; see also Ruben G. Rumbaut & Walter Ewing, The
Myth of Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of Assimilation: Incarceration Rates Among Native and ForeignBorn Men, in IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, SPECIAL REPORT (Spring 2007), available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/myth-immigrant-criminality-and-paradox-assimilation.
101. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Subnational Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit of Cultural
Cohesion, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1456–69 (2009).
102. Id. at 1469–76.
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regarding the viability of nonfederal regulations aimed at addressing
immigration.103 The federally created border wall does not suffer from the
constitutional vulnerabilities afflicting the legal restrictions constructed by state
and local governments.
Responding to this irrepressible pressure to create any possible response, the
most tangible, observable public policy outcome—a wall—offers several
advantages. First, a physical, heavy, imposing border fence disallows critique that
nothing was done. Its very presence is proof of action. As a comparison, consider
that in 2010, President Obama ordered a substantial cadre of National Guardsmen
to the southern border to aid in its control. While this move must at least
marginally aid in the interdiction of unlawful entrants, it is also difficult to quantify
and assess from the layperson’s vantage. Moreover, National Guardsmen—or any
border patrol force—is comprised of people who are inherently ephemeral facets
of the border landscape. Individuals cannot be in all places at all times, and just as
hastily as they were dispatched to the border, as national priorities change, they
can also be recalled or otherwise leave the area. Indeed, recently, many of those
same troops were removed from border patrol.104 A border wall, in contrast, is
fixed and permanent. It is always on the vigil.
Second, the logic of a wall connects with the polity in ways that other, likely
more effective border policies cannot or do not. Because of the presence of walls
and fences in our everyday domestic and residential interactions, a border wall
facilitates the citizenry’s belief in its value: if walls built around homes and land
can keep out unwanted persons, animals, and threats, so too a wall at the national
border keeps out undesirables. Even though Congress expressly justifies border
fortification using rule of law and national security, its decision to focus only on
the southern border105 where migrants cross for economic and labor reasons
suggests a less noble reason—or at least one that many would prefer not to voice
publically. Keeping out Mexican and Central American migrants is implicit
recognition of the “good life” that Americans live, and the government’s
investment in keeping the “basic” life of the global south out.106 These unvoiced

103. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011); United States v.
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, No Exception to the Rule: The
Unconstitutionality of State Immigration Enforcement Laws, 5 ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS 37 (2011).
104. Mike M. Ahlers, Administration to Draw Down National Guard Troops on Southwest Border,
CNN U.S., Dec. 20, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-20/us/us_border-national-guard_
1_national-guard-troops-border-patrol-border-security?_s=PM:US.
105. Contra Peter Andreas, The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border: Asymmetric Interdependence
in a Changing Security Context, 60 INT’L J. 449, 449 (2005) (“What began as US drug and immigration
control anxieties, mostly focused southward, have now been extended northward, as US border
security worries have shifted in the post-9/11 era to focus on the potential entry of terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction.”).
106. BROWN, supra note 4, at 28 (“The U.S. barrier responds mainly to U.S. popular anxieties
about the effects of an impoverished Global South on the American economy and culture.”); Fan,
supra note 4, at 721–22 (“But there is also another layer of horror, an existential one. . . . [T]he
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fears are the modern versions of the pernicious stereotypes openly expressed in
the not-so-distant past, when notions of the dirty and poor Mexican informed
public beliefs and societal ordering.107
The famous street artist, Banksy, at the Israel-Palestine border wall, made
explicit this underlying fear through his art.108 As a commentary on the evocative
and psychologically gratifying nature of a fence, on the Palestinian side of the wall,
he painted “holes” or “windows” in the fence through which Palestinians could
see what they were being excluded from. In these imagined holes and windows,
Banksy painted idyllic pictures of white sand beaches with palm trees or pastoral
and lush hills. Although neither of these depictions accurately portrays what one
would actually see through a hole in the Israel-Palestine fence, Banksy’s depiction
nevertheless captures the essential feeling the fence-building nation evokes when it
constructs a barrier intended to keep the less fortunate out. The fence therefore is
a monument to a longed-for past of unparalleled international economic
dominance and standard of living in the United States.
Further, the wall can effect “psychic humiliation” on the country and people
that wall purports to keep out,109 regardless of whether it actually keeps them out.
In the case of the U.S. southern border with Mexico, the fence gives state
imprimatur to the notion that undocumented migrants from Mexico—or even
migrants generally—are an inferior class of persons, who could never legitimately
claim to be a part of the American community. The wall buttresses the message
sent by the legal restrictions on Mexican migration, which, despite United States
proximity to, and history with, Mexico, codify unreasonably long wait times for
lawful migration from Mexico.110 Both the wall and immigration limitations

traumatic element is that the good life—with its bounteous material, . . . its many rights and
privileges . . . is founded on the exclusion of a multitude consigned to something less, a basic life
without what makes the good life sweet.”).
107. Emory S. Bogardus, The Mexican Immigrant and Segregation, 36 AM. J. OF SOC. 74, 77–80
(1930) (discussing American citizens’ attitudes towards Mexicans, and Mexican attitudes about
belonging in America).
108. Art Prankster Sprays Israeli Wall, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/entertainment/4748063.stm (including paintings described in the text above).
109. BROWN, supra note 4; see also Joel Roberts, Calderon Likens Fence to Berlin Wall, CBS NEWS
(Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/26/world/main2130155.shtml (quoting
former-President Vicente Fox on the day of signing the Secure Fence Act into law: “It is proof,
perhaps, that the United States does not see immigration as a subject that corresponds to both
countries”; and quoting then President-elect Calderon as stating, “The decision made by Congress
and the U.S. government is deplorable. Humanity committed a grave error by constructing the Berlin
wall and I am sure that today the United States is committing a grave error in constructing a wall
along our northern border.”).
110. See Visa Bulletin of March 2011, DEP’T ST. (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.travel.state.gov/
visa/bulletin/bulletin_5337.html (detailing long wait times for permanent residency for applicants
from Mexico under most visa categories).
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naturalize the belief among the U.S. citizenry that there are simply too many
Mexicans in the United States.111
Thus, the border wall acts as a graspable security blanket for the citizenry,
synthesizing an imagined governmental potency and helping obscure the
“traumatic reality”112 seething underneath. The traumatic reality hidden by the
southern border wall is the probability that human migration in a globalized world
and unified economic market is likely beyond the control of any one nation-state.
Expressive law theory substantiates the claim that the border fence can have these
palliative effects on the citizenry, even when it is impotent to eliminate unlawful
crossing.
Expressive law theorists teach that law is not simply about sanctions,113 but
also fundamentally about signaling the purposes, beliefs, attitudes, and mental
states of a community or society.114 As Brown notes, the use of a certain type of
road barrier in downtown New York after 9/11 reflected, but also generated, fear,
its presence itself conjuring a sense of emergency.115 So too, the border wall is
directly responsive to a citizenry’s need for comfort in times of anxiety caused by
perceived or real security and economic threats—or even abstract threats to a
rule-of-law culture. As public policy, it generates a “reassuring world picture” in a
historical moment calling for psychological and physical security.116 These effects
are only, and need only be, tangentially related to empirically measurable outcomes
in migration mitigation.
A law or public policy outcome renders information about the “intrinsic
features of the world.”117 Individuals aware of the public policy will make

111. See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POL’Y, March–April
2004, at 30 (“The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into
two people, two cultures, and two languages. . . . The United States ignores this challenge at its
peril.”).
112. Id. at 726; see also Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73, at 714 (noting that cognitive biases
that lead to “availability cascades” can help an objectively weaker position prevail over an evidencebased position).
113. Richard McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339, 373
(2000) (“Legislation influences behavior not only because it imposes sanctions, but also because it
signals patters of public approval. Thus, law matters for what it says in addition to what it does.”).
114. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) (“[W]e argue that most of the purposes, beliefs,
attitudes, intentions, and other mental states individuals can have on their own can also be properly
attributed to groups, including the State.”); see also Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73, at 689 (noting that
many people have little information about a particular policy problem, and are allowing themselves to
be led by others, which can lead to proliferation of misinformation). Moreover, expressive and
symbolic mental states can be attributed to governmental entities and the meaning of any particular
government action is socially constructed. Anderson & Pildes, supra at 1508, 1525; see also Dan M.
Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and the Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 345 (2001).
115. BROWN, supra note 4, at 73–77.
116. Id. at 26–28 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
117. Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1, 2–3 (2003) (“[T]hrough
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corresponding inferences about proper normative behavior and general societal
attitudes.118 The process of deliberation and voting in a representative body allows
individual citizens to infer that the policy outcome reflects superior information
than that which they alone would be able to gather.119
In the border fence context, this information-aggregating ability of visible
public policy outcomes incentivizes politicians to manipulate the information
deficit between lawmakers and the citizenry to help propel muscular border
policy.120 Although law can have norm-shaping effects when individuals
understand it to reflect aggregate preferences and superior information, in the
border wall context, the policy outcome (building a fence) seems to only have
norm-shaping and behavioral effects on those U.S. citizens within the territory
and not on those who intend to cross the border. Expressive law theory predicts
that once the government, through a democratic process, decides to build a fence
and then produces the fence, the polity may tend to subsequently believe that a
border wall can and will stop unwanted migration because it is ostensibly the
product of superior, aggregated information.
This perception, and the information deficit between lawmakers and
citizenry, can be exploited.121 In the fence building context, lawmakers appear
acutely aware of the limited ability of the fortified border to effectively stop
migration.122 Therefore, the policy outcome of a border fence does not reflect
superior information regarding the ability of a fence to actually stop unlawful

the process of information aggregation inherent in legislative decision-making, the law can provide
information about intrinsic features of the world. This information causes citizens to update their
prior beliefs and thereby changes individual behavior . . . independently of the law’s deterrent
effect.”).
118. Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73, at 689–701 (discussing how existence of official policies
and actions transmits signals to public and other officials with limited information); see also Catherine
L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 37–40 (2010) (discussing how
the existence of some legislative responses can trigger “epidemics” whereby such policies are
replicated).
119. Carpenter, supra note 118, at 3–5 (“The mechanism we analyze is merely the pooling of
information held by different legislators; even if individual legislators have no more information or
expertise than individual citizens, the legislative process of aggregating votes will provide citizens with
superior information.”).
120. Id. at 40 (noting that elected officials can manipulate the fear generated by informational
deficits for political gain).
121. See James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics,
and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF
RATIONALITY 153, 160 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (“Even in their normal policy making
activities, elected officials make no effort to provide objective information. They use whatever
rhetorical devices are likely to work. . . . Indeed, the public itself will sometimes induce pronounced
biases in the information that it receives. If the public has strong predispositions about an issue,
politicians will avoid taking positions or providing information that challenges those
predispositions.”); see also Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73 at 727; Carpenter, supra note 118 at 40.
122. HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18; see also Preston, supra note 15 (quoting Governor Rick
Perry of Texas).
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crossing.123 But, once created, the existence of the wall then helps convince the
public that the border is sealable, and the fence is a worthwhile legislative
endeavor, regardless of the underlying evidence regarding migration mitigation
(which, even if known by the public, may be taken as mistaken or perhaps
incomplete, given the purportedly better information evidenced by the legislative
outcome).
Thus, the border wall is a security blanket and opiate. Its familiarity as a
domestic symbol comforts the polity, allowing the citizenry to disengage from the
inevitability of migration and the potential deterioration of their standard of living.
Its creation as the result of a democratic process fuels the fantasy of its
effectiveness and suspends the disbelief between the wall’s purported function and
its ability to actually achieve that function.
3. Consolidating Federal Power Vis-à-Vis States and Localities
Finally, border fortification persists despite its inability to interdict because it
reifies federal power vis-à-vis subfederal entities. The past several years have
witnessed a significant rise in state and local regulation of immigrants and
immigration.124 Recently, Arizona passed or considered three separate laws,125
including the notorious S.B. 1070, all of which have been or will be challenged in
federal courts as violations of the supremacy clause or federal plenary power over
immigration. Then-Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano cited what she
characterized as federal failure to secure the border as her reason for signing
Arizona’s E-Verify law.126 The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld the law,
holding that it did not conflict with federal law.127
To the extent federal authorities desire to jealously guard their exclusive
power to regulate immigration—and the federal government’s response to
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the more recent Alabama House Bill 56 suggests it

123. Cf. McAdams, supra note 113, at 343 (“I am not claiming that law necessarily supplies
correct information, or that law inevitably supplies information not previously available . . . .”).
124. Cristina Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV.
567 (2008); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit of Cultural
Cohesion, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441 (2009); see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
State Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration, available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19897.
125. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
11-1051 (commonly known as Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and challenged by U.S. v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339
(9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845 (Dec. 12, 2011) (No.11-182)); Legal Arizona Worker’s Act
of 2007, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211–23-214 (upheld in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131
S. Ct. 1968 (2011)); and S.B. 1308 (2011), 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
126. See, e.g., Press Release, State of Arizona Executive Office of Janet Napolitano Governor,
Governor Signs Employer Sanctions Bill (July 2, 2007) (“Immigration is a federal responsibility, but I
signed HB 2779 because it is now abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of coping with
the comprehensive immigration reforms our country needs.”).
127. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
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does128—a border wall reminds nonfederal entities and interest groups of the
primacy and importance of the national government in immigration matters.
Although it is theoretically possible that individual states could, through compact,
agree to cooperate to build a wall along their respective state borders, the ability to
engage in interstate construction and international interdiction is firmly only
within the power of the federal government.129 Most obviously, the fortified
international border must cross state lines between California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas, rendering interstate wall building a clear Congressional
responsibility.
In addition, the construction of the fence requires the abrogation of dozens
of federal statutes governing the borderlands.130 While Congress, through the
REAL ID Act, allowed the DHS Secretary to seek waiver of these federal
requirements for wall construction, it has not authorized any state official or
private actor to do the same. Further, the cost of the national fence is borne by
taxpayers of the fifty states; it is unlikely that the significant construction and
maintenance costs could reasonably be borne by individual states. In short, only
the federal government can realistically, and in the present regulatory order,
legally, create an interstate fortification on the international border.131
This functional exclusivity reinvigorates and underscores the oft-repeated,
but descriptively and normatively thin,132 claim that state governments are
constitutionally prohibited from legislating with regard to immigrants and

128. See United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4863957 (11th Cir., Oct. 14, 2011); United States
v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (preliminarily enjoining parts of SB 1070 on
preemption grounds); Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 23 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html (quoting President
Obama’s criticism of Arizona’s law). Note that I am not arguing that the federal government does not
solicit state and local support in immigration law enforcement. See Memorandum from the Office of
Legal Counsel for the Attorney General, Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations (Apr. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/olc-memo-state-and-local-law-enforcement-immigration-laws;
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (popularly named “287(g) agreements,” allowing local law enforcement to
enter into memoranda of cooperation with the federal government). However, these examples
confirm that the federal government seeks state and local cooperation on terms that the federal
government authorizes, under permission from the federal government.
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (commerce clause authorizing Congress to regulate commerce
among the states and with foreign nations).
130. HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 31–32 (“Congress passed waiver language in the
REAL ID Act that allows the Secretary of DHS to waive all ‘legal requirements’ necessary to ensure
expeditious construction of the barriers and roads in the vicinity of the U.S. border.”).
131. Note that while Arizona recently has taken legislative steps to solicit funds for a fence
within the state, that proposed fence could only exist, if at all, on land owned by willing private
owners or the state itself. See Lacey, supra note 79 (“The most likely locations for the state’s planned
barriers are on state or private land . . . .”).
132. On this point, consider the significant rise in subnational immigration policy activity
despite general acceptance of national primacy in immigration matters. See also Rodríguez, supra note
124 (discussing the “lie” of federal exclusivity).
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immigration.133 The wall has no need for constitutional interpretation or nuanced
federalism analysis because of its geographic and pragmatic requirements. Building
a wall then, is not just a signal to the citizenry, but a signal to the separate states as
well: migration policy must be formulated at the federal level to the exclusivity of
the states, unless the federal government itself devolves authority or empowers
subfederal entities to participate.
III. BORDER WALL AND IMMIGRATION DISCOURSE
Having proposed reasons for the federal government’s continued border
wall policy, Part III unpacks two important ways in which the existence of the wall
subsequently changes the manner in which the citizenry and prosecutorial agents
think about migration, enforcement, and national sovereignty. First, the erection
of a fence helps import property law norms into immigration law. In doing so, the
existence of a fence facilitates the belief that unlawful presence is easily diagnosed,
and paves the path for citizen participation in identifying and apprehending
unlawfully present migrants. Second, the existence of a wall allows for imputation
of greater culpability to migrants. It naturalizes the idea of national border,
allowing migration to be treated as an existential threat to sovereignty. By doing
so, a border wall eases the implementation of harsher and ever-broadening
immigration enforcement schemes.
A. Importing Property Law Norms into Immigration Law
The border wall alters immigration discourse by eliding the immigration law
framework with one grounded in property law.134 This alternative legal framework
permits clearer and more easily understood justifications for targeting trespassers
into the nation-state. This Article has already argued that one of the wall’s chief
virtues was giving tangible form to nebulous legal sanctions. In addition, the
border wall helps legitimize legal sanctions by importing accessible property law
norms into the more arcane fields of international relations and immigration law.
Much scholarship and media commentary on border and immigration policy
has improvised themes on the Robert Frost poem “Mending Wall” and its oftquoted wisdom, “Good fences make good neighbors.”135 The poem itself centers
on the interaction of two neighbors with adjoining properties, concerned with,
133. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“[P]ower to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”).
134. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of
Property, Race, and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 981 (2010) (discussing local property
restrictions based on citizenship and arguing “[t]oday, two seemingly disparate areas of law—property
and immigration—are colliding.”).
135. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON 11 (2d ed., 1917); see, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, supra note 26 (“Good fences may make good neighbors, but bad fences make bad law.”);
see also Morgan Lewis, Comment, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors, But Do They Make Good Cents?, 41
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1193 (2009).
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and questioning that which should belong on one side and/or the other of the
wall.136 Fundamentally, the poem mines the potential for conflict and cohesion at
one of the most common types of borders—the domestic residential kind.137 At
these borders, however, property and tort law, not immigration law, govern
interactions.
The legal transgressions most easily associated with Frost’s poem are
nuisance and trespass.138 The presence of the wall clearly demarcates the boundary
and clarifies the point at which one of the neighbors—or his cows or trees—
crosses into the other’s land. Although the existence of recorded property deeds
renders a fence unnecessary as a legal marker of the property’s boundary, the
fence makes plain what the recorded property line dictates—that occupied spaces
must be kept separated and subject solely to the control of the occupying party.
But even more than marking the property line plainly and visibly, the fence
also helps manufacture and attribute moral culpability to the putative crosser. A
fence cannot be transgressed or overcome without conscious effort and a
volitional act. In Frost’s poem, the Sisyphean project of fixing the fence every year
mends the places in the wall that have become broken or become open.139 It is a
project worth pursuing year after year, despite the inevitability of degradation,
because the repaired fence communicates and reconfirms the property owner’s
intentions. The open or disrepaired boundary invites crossing, or at least fails to
provide clear, unequivocal notice to the trespasser of his unwelcome.
Importing these themes, the border wall at the U.S. southern border need
not eliminate migration to serve an important purpose for the government and the
citizenry. By importing property law frames into immigration law,140 the fence
accomplishes two critical tasks. First, it makes unlawful presence and entry
without inspection appear as easily diagnosed and discernible transgressions.

136. FROST, supra note 135, at 12 (“Before I built a wall I’d ask to know / What I was walling
in or walling out, / And to whom I was like to give offence.”).
137. BROWN, supra note 4, at 4 (“Gated communities in the U.S. are springing up everywhere,
but are especially plentiful Southwest cities near the wall with Mexico.”).
138. LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/nuisance (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011) (“Nuisance is something that interferes with the use of property by being
irritating, offensive, . . . or dangerous.”); Trespass—Criminal Law, FREE LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://law.jrank.org/pages/19129/Trespass.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (“Trespass is the
unauthorized and unprivileged intentional physical intrusion onto the land of another. . . . [T]he
Model Penal Code limits trespass culpability to cases in which there is an intrusion into . . . land that
has notice posted, or otherwise communicated, precluding trespass.”).
139. FROST, supra note 135, at 11 (“The gaps I mean, / No one has seen them made or heard
them made, / But at spring mending-time we find them there. / I let my neighbor know beyond the
hill; / And on a day we meet to walk the line / And set the wall between us once again.”).
140. See Fan, supra note 4, at 727 (“[Walls and fences] are the emblems of ownership. The
fence at once embodies the exclusion but also disavows the traumatic contingency of exclusion by
occluding and naturalizing it in the emblem of property, one of the law’s most powerful means for
justifying the vagaries in the distribution of good fortune.”).
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Second, it reinvigorates ideas of the citizenry’s possession over U.S. territory,
helping to personalize the transgression of the border crosser.
On the first point, the border fence facilitates analogies between
international border transgression and residential fence transgression. By doing so,
the existence of the fence assists adoption of the uncritical, but alluring, logic of
the anti-illegal immigrant slogan “what part of illegal don’t you understand?”141
Although even the Supreme Court recognizes that the honest answer to that
question is “complex,”142 crossing in the presence of, or with the knowledge of
the existence of, a fence transplants innately recognizable neighborly norms into
the complicated arena of immigration law. Eschewing nuance, this substitution
empowers anyone in the citizenry to be the judge of unlawful presence, as they
would in their own home and neighborhood. Just as property owners can
comprehend an uninvited person, noise, or disturbance on their property, the
border fence coaxes the same logic on immigration matters.
This analogizing effect possibly explains why laws like Arizona’s S.B. 1070,
and increased local involvement in immigration enforcement through 287(g)
agreements, have emerged after significant fence building activity.143 These
subfederal enforcement schemes rely, at base, on the notion that local law
enforcement officials and state residents, with minimal or no training in
immigration law, can diagnose those who appear to be unlawfully present.144 This
oversimplified version of immigration law ignores the complexity of determining
which state and federal crimes, for example, are “aggravated felonies” or “crimes
of moral turpitude” that result in removability and obscures the fact that even
unlawfully present persons may have asylum claims or are otherwise eligible for
immigration parole, prosecutorial discretion, or deferral. Schemes that allow for
local enforcement of immigration law make sense only when determining unlawful

141. Lawrence Downes, Editorial, What Part of ‘Illegal’ Don’t You Understand?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2007, at A1.
142. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct 1473, 1488–89 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The
Court’s new approach is particularly problematic because providing advice on whether a conviction
for a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex. . . . Many other terms of
the INA are similarly ambiguous or may be confusing to practitioners not versed in the intricacies of
immigration law.”).
143. Cf. Villazor, supra note 134, at 984 (“In particular, the current discussion of local housing
ordinances [affecting unauthorized persons] has overlooked the ways in which these laws parallel alien
land laws that states passed in the early twentieth century.”).
144. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (codified in relevant part in ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 11-1051(B) and requiring officers make a reasonable attempt to determine immigration status
of a stopped, detained, or arrested person if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully
present in the U.S.); id. § 13-3883(A)(5) (authorizing officers to make a warrantless search of a person
where there is probable cause to believe the person has committed an offense that makes that person
removable); id. § 11-1051(G)–(L) (allowing residents to sue state officials for adopting a policy of
restricting enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal
law)).
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presence and deportability are imagined to be as easy as determining when a
neighbor crosses a fence adjoining properties.
Second, citizens use fences in their domestic, residential lives to delineate
land over which property law grants ownership and control. The fence at the
southern border permits the same type of reasoning with regards to migration. By
constructing U.S. territory as “owned” by citizens, a fence permits the citizenry to
conceive of border transgressors as pure trespassers who can be expelled at the
owners’ whim, just as unwanted solicitors on private property. The construct of
ownership facilitates the expulsion of border transgressors for any reason—
cultural or racial dilution, for example—just as owners of property need not
provide reasons for their decision to entertain some guests but not others.
The idea of citizen “ownership”—and its converse of foreign
dispossession—finds historical roots in the Alien Land Laws of the early twentieth
century, which prevented noncitizens who were ineligible for citizenship from
owning or leasing property.145 As Professor Rose Cuison Villazor has persuasively
argued, such laws were enforced by states like California in an attempt to expel a
racially identifiable group from the state.146 Although such laws were either struck
down or repealed, the legacy of these laws and the intersection of citizenship and
property rights is still important today in evaluating contemporary restrictionist
measures by states and localities.147 Further, this historical background lays the
foundation for the underlying tropes of citizen “ownership” animating national
border fencing today.
The property ownership paradigm created by the fence permits the citizenry
to call for the expulsion of migrants regardless of whether the presence of
migrants is economically beneficial to the citizenry. In the domestic setting, within
local zoning limits and community rules, property owners are not required to
maximize the value of their property and land through improvements. Even if it is
in their best financial interest to do so, individual owners are free to decide that
they are not interested in optimizing their property’s economic worth. Thus, the
border fence permits the citizenry as a collective to diminish the significance of
economic arguments favoring free labor migration across the southern border.
More fundamentally, this framework created by the border fence facilitates the
polity’s resistance to the conventional cost-benefit case outlined in Part I. Even if
the public accepts that the fence entails significant costs with minimal benefits, as
property owners, the citizenry is empowered to make that seemingly irrational
choice.

145. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (striking down California’s alien land law on
equal protection grounds, as applied to a Japanese American citizen who was denied property
ownership rights because of his father’s national origin).
146. Villazor, supra note 134, at 991 (“Indeed, many Californians saw restrictions in property
rights as a crucial method of deterring Japanese from coming to the state.”).
147. Id. at 1023–40.
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B. Naturalizing the Idea of a National Border
The physical fence imputes culpability to the migrant, thereby justifying swift
and harsh government action. The physical border wall does this by naturalizing
the idea of a national border and providing visible notice that putative migrants
are unwelcome. Here, the Article argues that a low-tech, physical border barrier
uniquely normalizes the concept of a national border, and defines such boundaries
as natural and prepolitical. Then, once created, the wall generates and contributes
to the background legal and social context in which the wall is viewed. Thus, the
border wall is not just the product of political, legal, and social forces, but is itself
an active participant in the production of the unlawful migrant “problem.”
A striking, but often overlooked, fact about U.S. policy at the southern
border is that the fence post-dates more advanced technologies to fortify the
border. Apart from the fourteen-mile construction at the San Diego and Mexico
border pursuant to Operation Gatekeeper,148 the federal government’s initial
strategy to control unlawful entries over the past few decades was based on virtual
and electronic technologies.149 The Integrated Surveillance Intelligence Service
(ISIS), consisting of motion, infrared, seismic, and magnetic sensors, was
introduced in 1997.150 ISIS evolved into the America Shield Initiative in 2004,
supplementing those sensors with high-tech surveillance technologies to patrol the
border.151 In 2006, DHS replaced the America Shield Initiative with the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI) which also employed varied and technologically advanced
techniques.152 And, it was a version of SBI, known as SBInet, that was finally
cancelled by the current administration in January 2011.153
The DHS and private individuals, taking a page from several successful
internet ventures, have even attempted to crowdsource border monitoring over
the web, allowing everyday civilians to play virtual border agent.154 Undoubtedly,
148. NEVINS, supra note 5, at 2–5.
149. Rey Koslowski, Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies, BORDER BATTLES (July
31, 2006), http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Koslowski (“The use of surveillance technologies by the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) goes back to the 1970s and 1980s when lowlight video cameras and portable electronic intrusion-detection ground sensors were deployed at the
border.”).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.; Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Announces SBInet Contract
Award to Boeing (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/
pr_1158876536376.shtm.
153. Pelofsky, supra note 52.
154. Brandi Grissom, Virtual Border Surveillance Program Ineffective, Cost Millions, EL PASO TIMES, Jan.
26, 2009, http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_11552806 (describing Texas virtual border surveillance
program funded by federal grant money). Civilian groups maintained cameras on the border and would
either stream or post video to a website where their members could report suspected illegal entry by
noncitizens. See Arizona Border Defenders (AZBD)—Videos, ARIZ. BORDER DEFENDERS (November 22,
2011, 00:43), http://www.azborderdefenders.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63
&Itemid=97; TECHNOPATRIOTS, http://technopatriots.com/articles (closed in 2010).
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these technologies and techniques are not anathema to a fence; they may be
supplementary or complementary. Recently, however, while the government has
reconsidered and abandoned some of its virtual border control strategies,155 it has
nevertheless continued with its physical border construction.
Only after many modern and sophisticated attempts to police the border did
Congress pass the SFA, and initiate systemic wall construction.156 Even as the
federal government recently abandoned virtual fence projects due to cost
considerations, funding for nonvirtual fence construction continues.
This evolution is counterintuitive, or at the very least, perplexing. Seemingly,
enforcement and interdiction strategies would evolve towards virtual and high
technology fixes, and away from brute, object-oriented policies. Commentators
have argued that the physical wall’s emergence after high-tech methods appears
backwards and anachronistic.157
The obvious point of these critiques and comparisons to newer technologies
is that the wall is an archaic device. Its existence conjures images of castles, moats,
the Greek citadels, Hadrian’s Wall, the Great Wall of China, and the Berlin Wall—
in short, the vestiges and strategies of once great empires and bygone eras. None
of those walls exist today except as tourist sites and monuments to the border
control of yesteryear. In the contemporary world, the fence at the United States
southern border finds its only reasonably comparable counterpart in the wall built
by Israel ostensibly to control terror threats from Palestinians.158
But to argue that the U.S. border fence eschews modernity while embracing
antiquity misses a vital truth: a wall is useful precisely because it connects with an
ancient past. By juxtaposing current border fortification with a time immemorial, a
wall transcends our current political and historical moment. This transcendence
helps obscure the fact that the border is a contemporary political, legal, and social
construction. The border wall naturalizes the idea and existence of a national
boundary, moving it beyond its politically contingent reality as the negotiated

155. Julia Preston, Homeland Security Cancels ‘Virtual Fence’ After $1 Billion Is Spent, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/us/politics/15fence.html.
156. Department of Homeland Security, supra note 152.
157. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 4, at 80 (“[Walls’] physicality makes them seem like a literal
throwback to another time, a time of fortresses and kings, militias and moats, . . . rather than a time of
smart bombs, missile shields in space, global warming, [and] digital touch pads . . . .”); Kevin R.
Johnson, Opening the Floodgates, Why America Needs to Rethink Its Borders and Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L.
REV. 3, 3 (2008) (“In terms of immigration policy, the nation still lives in a world of kingdoms with
moats, walls, and barriers, rather than a modern world of mass transportation, the internet, and daily
international intercourse.”).
158. BROWN, supra note 4, at 27 (“The global proliferation of walling itself increasingly
legitimates walls, especially in Western democracies, where we would expect such legitimation to be
hard won.”). Even that comparison, however, is highly circumscribed. The Israel-Palestine wall
divides two ancient cultures, each vying for statehood and control over the same vital land. Further, it
is built several miles away from the internationally recognized border of Israel, thereby not precisely
defining the national border. Finally, its primary concern is security and terrorism-related interdiction.
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boundary between two nation-states, into primordial primacy.159 Insulating the
border fence within a narrative of ancient cultures marginalizes the effect of
contemporary policy debate regarding the efficacy or normative desirability of
muscular border policy.
When the border is perceived as natural, ancient, and prepolitical, it in turn
normalizes and justifies the legal structure and framework of border enforcement
and immigration policy generally. Therefore, just as the background legal
consequences of border and immigration violations help give rise to a tangible and
visible border,160 the physical border in turn sanctifies a stern legal structure and
rigorous immigration enforcement.
In comparison, when the border is viewed as a wholly human-created and
contemporary phenomenon, tough enforcement cannot be justified easily by
reference to the migrant’s crossing of the national perimeter. Instead, the
government must also satisfy the more searching, second-order inquiry as to
whether such crossing should even be deemed unlawful in the first place. Thus,
the government must provide two different normative justifications before
imposing its authority and force on border transgressors. Accordingly, when the
border is correctly understood for what it is—a wholly constructed idea that can
be dismantled just as easily as it was made—harsh legal consequences and rigorous
enforcement require critical discourse and defense.
Once the border is naturalized as an ancient and primordial fact, however,
governmental crackdowns on undocumented populations acquire “easy
legitimacy.”161 Even if one argues that nebulous factors, like willing employers and
labor shortages in certain economic sectors, are de facto invitations to migrants
that evince tacit consent to their presence, the wall retorts. It provides notice that
the crossing is unauthorized, makes plain the migrant’s decision to willingly cross,
and thereby legitimizes even harsh governmental action that may follow.
Although the presence of a fence vel non does not alter the migrant’s
culpability in the legal sense, the fence transforms the moral and social
understanding of the migrant’s crossing that informs the legal consequence of
uninspected entry. By translating border violations into the talk of neighborly
relations, the wall helps supplant the narrative of the hungry, hard-working
migrant crossing the border for work in the United States with the image of the
dangerous trespasser. Neither prosecutors nor the public need feel remorse
because the rule of law, both as abstract democratic legal outcome and as a
hardened wall, was transgressed.

159. Baud & van Schendel, supra note 95, at 224 (“Sometimes adult borderlands are perceived
as ‘eternal,’ as part of the natural order handed down by earlier generations.”); cf. BROWN, supra note
4, at 48.
160. See supra Part II.
161. See BROWN, supra note 4, at 32 (“Most walls constructed by nation-states today draw on
the easy legitimacy of sovereign border control . . . .”).
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The nation-state’s decision to attach significant legal consequence to the
unlawful crossing, need only be justified on the basis that the border was violated.
Since association with ancient iconography frames the border as prepolitical and
prelegal, transgressing it is an attack on the very sovereignty and existence of the
nation-state. Such existential transgressions then can be dealt with by any means,
even those that are of dubious constitutionality.162
Indeed, this view of borders and sovereignty undergirds the Supreme Court’s
foundational immigration cases, Chae Chan Ping v. United States and Fong Yue Ting v.
United States.163 Those cases attribute prepolitical, prelegal, and preconstitutional
status to the meaning of sovereignty and national power to control admission and
expulsion of migrants. The simple physicality of the border fence, conjuring a time
immemorial, reifies the extraconstitutional nature of immigration regulation
reflected in those foundational cases.
In addition to normalizing border regulation and sanctifying the background
legal framework, the border wall helps intensify perception of the very problem it
purports to address.164 Borrowing again from expressive law theory, Professor
Dan Kahan notes that when the government engages in dramatic gestures to make
individuals aware of certain penalties, the gestures themselves cause individuals to
believe that the phenomenon requiring the penalty is prevalent.165 In Kahan’s
example, the raising of tax penalties and the government’s gestures to make
taxpayers aware of those enhancements create the perception that more taxpayers
than before are evading taxes.166 The same theory is easily applied in the
immigration context. Once created, a border wall is visible reassurance that the
incidence of unlawful entry, the possibility of a Mexican invasion into the United
States, and the likelihood that terrorists are using the southern border, are viable
and credible existential threats to the nation.167
In this way, the bogeyman of the Mexican migrant or clandestine terrorist—
the same one that helped lend public support to authorizing the fence in the first
instance—is given a second life by the existence of the wall. In this regard,
consider the participation of organized private actors in the project of fence
162. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)–(c) (2011) (authorizing expedited removal, and removal
without hearing); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (authorizing detention of aliens without criminal trial or bill
of rights protections).
163. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 United States 581, 603 (1889) (“That the government of the
United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is
a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that
extent is an incident of every independent nation.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (upholding deportation law allowing Chinese persons to be deported without testimony of
credible white witness).
164. See generally Carpenter, supra note 118; Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73.
165. Kahan, supra note 114, at 342.
166. Id.
167. See Morales, supra note 84, at 53 (“The very act of building a fence is proof to the
populace that its fear of invasion . . . has a strong basis-in-fact.”).
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building or fixing. The existence of a partial, government-created fence provides
the impetus for private actors, like the Minutemen Civil Defense Corps, to help
complete or fix the fence.168 Private actors engage in fence building despite
knowledge that their actions are mostly symbolic because they perceive the threat
of undocumented migration as important enough to compel government action.169
So important, in fact, that perceived government failure or delay in providing a
solution cannot be idly tolerated; the concerned citizenry must help defend
nationhood and sovereignty on its own.170
The attempt to naturalize the border through ancient iconography
undermines the fact that borders are constructed and therefore capable of
deconstruction. Once the possibility of deconstruction is marginalized, entry
without inspection across the southern border resembles malum in se rather than
malum prohibitum; the sovereign may discover and deport those individuals with
minimal regard to their claims of belonging.171 Concurrently, the ability of border
fortification to substantiate and elevate public perception of a migration problem
solidifies support for the exercise of sovereign power,172 even to the extent of the
public demanding solutions beyond the scope of the individual nation-state
sovereign.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE BORDER WALL
Part IV looks to the future of the border fence and the saliency of national
borders. Ironically, the creation of a wall is a harbinger of the decline of the
importance of the nation-state boundary, presaging the dismantling of the
muscular national sovereignty and the wall that purports to protect it. In essence,
while the border wall can change the narrative of immigration enforcement and
unlawful migration, it can do so only for so long. At some point, the wall will
cease to obscure the growing chasm between the realities of migration and
fantasies of unilateral national control over the same.
Although the physical border can be self-generative in the ways discussed in
Part III.B, it can also be self-destructive, or, as Wendy Brown argues, a signal of
“waning sovereignty.”173 First, while the border wall may be intended to do more
symbolic work than interdiction, its expressive effect is limited by the legitimacy
crisis it also creates. Second, while a physical fence is the very embodiment of the
rule of law in tangible form, the creation of the structure requires several
168. Fan, supra note 4, at 712.
169. Id.
170. See Lacey, supra note 79 (noting that supporters of the Arizona fence fund in the state
legislature argue that a privately funded state fence will “allow everyday people fed up with the
inability of Congress to address the problem of illegal immigration to contribute personally to a
solution”).
171. Motomura, supra note 3, at 2049–55.
172. BROWN, supra note 4, at 39.
173. Id. at 24–26.
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deviations from the rule of law. Finally, the presence of a fence presages the
decline of the saliency of nation-state borders; the deterioration of the national
boundary’s significance undermines the need to protect the borders of the nationstate with border walls. Relatedly, the decision to physically fortify the national
border limits the subsequent policy choices of a nation-state, ultimately acting as
either as a harbinger of national impotence or totalitarianism.
A. A Growing Legitimacy Crisis
Even as expressive law theory sheds light on important incentives that
motivate the federal government and citizenry to promote fence building, the
behavior and norm-altering potential of border wall policy has limited shelf-life.
Certainly, the ability of a wall to signal the possibility of border containment will
alter the attitudes and voting preferences of the U.S. citizenry. However, the
border wall seems to have insignificant behavior and norm-changing effects
outside of the citizenry.
While doing little to actually stop unlawful migration, border walls may
intensify feelings about the border for populations on both sides. Because the
meaning of any public policy outcome—here, the border fence—depends on
social interaction and the practices of multiple constituencies, it need not have the
same meaning for everyone affected.174 In obvious terms, despite much of the
American polity’s sincere desire to believe that everyone should and does
understand the simplicity of border wall transgression, a prospective migrant has
no reason to share, or even comprehend, this view. For those for whom the
border is not a naturalized fact, or for those who follow historic and familial
migration patterns, or for those swayed by the osmotic pressure of labor need, the
imposition of a border fence legitimates neither the border nor tough enforcement
against unlawful entrants.
While prospective migrants might worry about increased coyote prices, fear
the prospect of human traffickers, and dread the cartelization of the narcotics and
human smuggling, the existence of a wall fails to naturalize and normalize an
inflexible and sacrosanct border for the very population the border attempts to
control. These limitations of the border’s expressive capacity in a transnational
context suggest growing disconnect between the citizenry’s and putative migrants’
perceptions of the wall.
Based on this increasingly disparate contextual understanding between
walled-in and walled-out populations, the border wall suffers, or will eventually
suffer, from a crisis of legitimacy. Compliance with border regulation from those
kept outside diminishes when the policy is viewed as unjust.175 If putative unlawful

174. C. Edwin Baker, Injustice and the Normative Nature of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 578, 592–95
(2001); Kahan, supra note 114, at 345.
175. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410 (2005) (showing through
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entrants do not feel they owe any duty to the United States prior to their entry, do
not recognize the U.S. law as legitimate authority, or do not feel that the border
policy and the border wall reflect their own community or broader international
norms, they are more likely to enter despite the existence of a border fence.176
The border, and the broader immigration enforcement system, cannot
effectively function if the primary way of inducing compliance is through law
enforcement. Any functioning and healthy enforcement system depends on
voluntary compliance by those whose compliance is sought.177 In their study of
American policing of Muslims, Professors Tyler, Huq, and Schulhofer arrive at a
similar conclusion regarding the polity’s view of law enforcement.178 They further
prove through empirical study that targeted and harsh enforcement tactics against
one particular group (at least in the domestic context) can have spillover effects
that negatively impact evaluations of law enforcements’ legitimacy.179 Thus,
despite the significant discourse-altering benefits of border wall policy, and the
incentives to create fortified borders, at some point the wall’s negative outputs—
especially its inability to achieve legitimacy and compliance with one of its target
groups—will likely make it a mockery, even amongst those who currently support
its creation.180
The legitimacy of border policy matters because it reflects back on the

empirical data that “perceived injustice of a particular law diminishes respect for the law in general”).
176. Id. at 1430 (arguing that people obey the law because they feel they owe a duty to
legitimate authority, when the law reflects community norms).
177. Martin, supra note 29, at 549 (“No law enforcement system is healthy if assuring
compliance must rely primarily on direct enforcement through the personal attention of the police.
Healthy systems are based on widespread voluntary compliance, leaving police to target misbehavior
around the margins.”).
178. See Aziz Huq, Tom Tyler & Stephen Schulhofer, Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law
Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419, 421
(2011) (“The ‘procedural justice’ model of policing contends that people’s reactions to law
enforcement are shaped primarily by evaluations of the fairness of police conduct. . . . This model
further proposes that procedural justice induces a belief in the legitimacy of the police, i.e. trust and
confidence in the police and the view that they out to be obeyed.”).
179. Id. at 20 (“The study finds support for the claim that people do attend to the abuse of
their groups’ rights in both ordinary times and also when faced with unusually grave threats. . . . This
suggests that the police lose legitimacy in the larger community when they engage in unfair tactics
directed at one subgroup but generally viewed as being unfair by the entire population.”); see also Tom
Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans 17–
23 (N.Y.U. School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 10-15, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559923 (identifying the central role
of perceptions of fairness in inducing cooperation with law enforcement and viewing law
enforcement as legitimate).
180. In some cases, the wall is especially easy to mock—for example, it actually fences “out”
some people who are U.S. citizens living in the U.S. See Liz Goodwin, The Texans Who Live on the
‘Mexican Side’ of the Border Fence: ‘Technically, We’re in the United States,’ YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 21,
2011), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/lookout/teas-americans-live-wong-side-border-fence-christams183312787.html (describing the plight of U.S. property owners who live on the “other” side of the
fence).
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nation-state. The border cannot remain an exceptional land, beyond logical, legal,
and constitutional restraint. In their study of the factors motivating the recent
trend towards wall building, Professors Wittenberg and Hassner argue that wallbuilding states are almost uniformly wealthy and authoritarian.181 Indeed, the
United States is one of only a handful of nonauthoritarian regimes to construct a
wall primarily to stop economic migrants. In other words, in comparison, the
United States actions resemble those of Burma and Iran—countries whose moral
legitimacy and method of governance are constantly under attack by U.S.
policymakers.182
B. The Wall and Rule of Law
The creation of the fence, imagined as a testament to, and an embodiment
of, the rule of law, does significant violence to the rule of law.183 Those in favor of
harsh actions against undocumented persons and border crossers often cite
maintaining the integrity of the rule of law as reason for their beliefs.184 Amongst
the many blameworthy descriptions foisted upon undocumented migrants—as job
snatchers, as public welfare consumers, as crime mongers, and as alien invaders—
one of the most effective is that of border violator as flouter of the rule of law.
In this view, rewarding border and border wall transgression through lax
enforcement only breeds more contempt for the law. This rhetoric is
understandably popular. It appears principled and divorced from pure xenophobic
and racialized fears. Unlike the other constructions and characterizations of
migrant illegality, it resists easy empirical contestation. And, as this Paper has
argued, notions of fidelity to the neutral rule of law helped spur fence building in
the first place.185
But, consider the sheer breadth of duly enacted federal law that must be
abrogated or waived to clear legal ground for the border wall.186 In the REAL ID
181. Hassner & Wittenberg, supra note 25, at 20 (“[B]uilding states are significantly richer than
target states. . . . Second, although builders are more democratic than targets in relative terms, the
average builder is still solidly authoritarian in absolute terms.”).
182. Id.; see Jonathan Head, Burma Rejects Foreign Criticism, BBC NEWS, May 28, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8071849.stm; Press Release, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Message from the President Regarding Iran (Mar. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/message-president-regarding-iran (“The actions and
policies of the Government of Iran are contrary to the interests of the United States . . . .”).
183. Cf. Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73, at 736 (noting that policy responses built on
informational cascades create “serious problems for democracy,” as apparently democratic outcomes
will rest on misinformation).
184. See, e.g., Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 149 CONG. REC. 22,948 (2003)
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (“America’s
strength is based on its commitment to the rule of law. . . . In the world of immigration laws, a facade
of enforcement that holds no real consequences for law breakers is both dangerous and
irresponsible.”).
185. See supra Part II.
186. See generally GILMAN, supra note 14, at 6 (“On April 1, 2008, in the midst of significant
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Act, Congress authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security—an appointed
executive officer—to waive the requirements or application of any federal law that
hindered wall construction, while virtually eliminating judicial review.187 Using this
unchecked authority, former Secretary Chertoff sought and received exemptions
from over thirty laws passed by Congress. Notably, many were environmental and
wildlife statutes pertaining to atmospheric, water, and habitat concerns that
transcend political boundaries. The wall does not just conceptually dismiss
democratic will expressed in those statutes; it also substantively—and
incomprehensibly—erects a hard political boundary on and between inherently
prepolitical subjects, like water and wildlife.
The wall thus embodies of the rule of law at the border only by undermining
prior law and the apolitical order of wildlife and ecological systems. Ironically
then, both the transgressing migrant and the wall she scales are amenable to the
same critique; both can be branded affronts to our rule-of-law culture.
C. Presaging the Decline of National Boundary and Power
Finally, since the border fence likely cannot eliminate unwanted migration,
physical border fortification essentially showcases the performance of sovereignty,
while hiding the vulnerabilities of the sovereign.188 Building a wall is a visible claim
to nation-state power with scant substantive backing. For example, the fourteenmile fence constructed by the INS in 1993 as part of Operation Gatekeeper is
hard to characterize as anything but a simulation of sovereign power over the
border for its own sake. No one could have seriously thought a fourteen-mile
fortification could have more than a cosmetic effect on unlawful entries.189
Such action, however, has prophetic and self-generative properties. Thirteen
years after Operation Gatekeeper, U.S. lawmakers pointed to the success and
existence of the fourteen-mile San Diego wall as justification for the seven
hundred-mile extension in the SFA.190 In essence, border wall enthusiasts are
forced to rely on the existence of other past and contemporary walls for the
legitimacy of their own fortifications, rather than the actual interdiction that a wall
opposition to the construction of the wall, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff executed a waiver of 30
environmental and other laws pursuant to his authority granted by federal statute.”); id. at 47 (listing,
by statute, the Legal Requirements Waived by DHS for the Construction of the San Diego Border
Fence); see also HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 31–33; Measure Seeks to Give Border Patrol Power to
Circumvent Environmental Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2011, at A21.
187. HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 33 (“With respect to the Secretary’s use of the waiver
authority, the provision allows legal redress only for constitutional violations and limits review to the
district courts of the United States (though the Supreme Court retains discretionary appellate review
over district court decisions). In essence, an individual could not sue DHS for bypassing the
environmental impact statements requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (a law it has
waived) because that would be a statutory violation . . . .”).
188. BROWN, supra note 4, at 90–103.
189. Id.; HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 2–3.
190. See HADDAL ET AL., supra note 18.
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may accomplish. This self-referential justification merely reveals a desire to project
strength, rather than the ability to demonstrate strength through actual
interdiction of unlawful border crossers.
This “theatricalized and spectacularized” display of sovereign authority in a
border wall, Wendy Brown argues, is symbolic not of the potency of the nationstate but of its deterioration in relation to other international and transnational
forces.191 These economic and informational forces chip away at the relevancy of
the nation-state as the arbiter of human movement. The existence of wall then,
both covers and uncovers many a legal theorists withering critique: the absolute
power to control borders, ascribed to the federal government in cases like Chae
Chan Ping, Fong Yue Ting, Knauff v. Shaugnessy, and Shaughnessy v. Mezei, is, and always
has been, fiction and fantasy.192 It is neither natural nor inherent, and it can be
unwritten and deconstructed just as surely as it was baldly inscribed.
Undoubtedly, the notion that a border fence evinces the diminution of the
importance of the nation-state is contested. Ayelet Shachar, for example,
convincingly showcases the ways in which the United States has redefined and
shifted its border to regain and reassert robust sovereign control.193 Shachar notes
that the border fence is only one component of a larger project of expanding and
changing the way border is perceived and regulated; in combination with other
strategies, the border wall is indicative of the federal sovereign’s reinvigorated
authority. Yet, Shachar’s narrative is not inconsistent with Brown’s. As the
sovereign’s power to robustly control its borders and eliminate unwanted
migration fades, the sovereign responds by both retrenching a static, visible, and
ancient symbol (the wall)194 and by altering the border’s legal construction (by
expanding enforcement reach inside and outside the nation-state) to allow more
opportunities for control.
Moreover, regardless whether border fences are a marker of nation-state
strength or weakness, it is clear that the imposition of muscular border policy with
a border wall demarcates a crossroads. National borders are constructs; they are
the imagined limits to which the national sovereign projects its territorial power.195
The fence moves the border from imagination into tangible reality. In doing so, it
191. BROWN, supra note 4, at 24 (“What appears at first blush as the articulation of state
sovereignty actually expresses its diminution relative to other kinds of global forces—the waning
relevance and cohesiveness of the form.”); Rodríguez, supra note 11, at 224.
192. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (denying due process claim of
noncitizen excluded based on confidential information, and ascribing plenary power over exclusion to
political branches); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (excluding from reentry without due
process, noncitizen long-time resident of the U.S. based on confidential information).
193. Shachar, supra note 78, at 837 (“It is ironic that the U.S. immigration talk is so heavily
focused on erecting the fence as a symbol of regained sovereignty, while its immigration regulation
and enforcement actions are in fact far more multifaceted and nuanced.”).
194. Id.; Fan, supra note 4, at 711.
195. Baud & van Schendel, supra note 95, at 211.
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may be, as historians Baud and van Schendel write, the “ultimate” symbol of
sovereignty.196 Perhaps unintended on their end, the word “ultimate” has dual
meaning—either the fence is the most powerful expression of sovereignty, or,
alternatively, it is the last and desperate expression of sovereignty.
In light of this duality, consider the five stages of borderland evolution
mapped by Baud and van Schendel in their comparative analysis of various border
regions: embryonic, adolescent, adult, declining, and defunct.197 They characterize
the declining stage as the point when the national border begins to lose political
salience, and significant cross-border networks rise. Although the U.S. southern
border maintains its political and legal significance, supraborder and transnational
networks have indeed emerged and entrenched.198
In the process of transition through any of these stages, Baud and van
Schendel’s comparative analysis yields three categories of border behavior—the
quiet, the unruly, and the rebellious borderland.199 The current situation at the
U.S. and Mexico border bears hallmarks of both the unruly and rebellious
borderland. In the unruly borderland, despite the imposition of a politically
negotiated border, the local societies in the border region defy the legitimacy of
the border, and the sovereign exposes itself as weak when it unrealistically
attempts to control communities at the border.200 The claims of cross-border
solidarity in border communities, along with the nation-states’ inability to curb
unlawful entry fit this description.201 In the rebellious borderland, they describe
regional elite joining with the local population against the government that seeks
to impose the rules of the border.202 The disputes in Arizona and elsewhere over
employer sanctions, and the broad coalitions that have been forged—between
large corporations and immigrant activists—to challenge restrictive immigration
enforcement, evince low-level resistance to the nation-state.203

196. Id. at 226 (“This display of statehood symbolizes the effort of each state to maintain
exclusive control of its half of the borderland, and in this respect the border is the ultimate symbol of
sovereignty.”).
197. Id. at 223–25.
198. Angelucci, supra note 22, at 35 (“A more stable group of illegal migrants may have worse
long-term effects on the stock of undocumented migration than a highly mobile one: the
establishment of U.S.-based illegal migrant enclaves may decrease migration costs for prospective
migrants . . . .”). But cf. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007)
(developing the idea of transnational labor citizenship that would create a network of cross-border
workers, and call for opening of nation-state borders to labor migration).
199. Baud & van Schendel, supra note 95, at 227–29.
200. Id.
201. M. Isabel Medina, At the Border: What Tres Mujeres Tell Us About Walls and Fences, 10 J.
GENDER, RACE, AND JUST. 245, 245–55 (2007); Valencia-Weber & Lopez, supra note 11, at 266–91.
202. Baud & van Schendel, supra note 95, at 227–29.
203. See, e.g., Rachel Port, Strange Bedfellows on Plaintiff’s Side in Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20101207/bs_ac/
7322700_strange_bedfellows_on_plaintiffs_side_in_chamber_of_commerce_v_whiting (noting the
support of civil rights groups for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the Chamber’s continuing
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Seen in this light, the U.S. and Mexico border appears as one in a turbulent
process of entering a declining stage of border maintenance, rather than a moment
of reinvigorated nation-state sovereignty. Of course, the relationship between the
United States and its southern neighbors is hardly the same as the borderlands
used by Baud and van Schendel as examples of these unruly and rebellious
processes.204 While current comparisons to some of the most unstable regions in
the world are inapposite, the United States’ relationship with Mexico and Central
America may also change over time. Even now, the border fence, at least in part,
helps produce the marked increase in violence in Mexican border towns and the
flourishing of a mafia and cartel economy for cross-border traffic.205
Even if one remains unconvinced that the border wall portends a decline in
sovereign potency and the saliency of national borders, the erection of a fence
inherently limits a nation-state’s subsequent policy choices.206 Once erected for the
stated purpose of interdicting and eliminating unlawful entry, but under conditions
where deterrence is either marginally or negligibly achieved, the federal
government leaves itself with few options.
First, it could expressly concede that the fence is largely symbolic and only
marginally deters putative migrants. This option is unlikely and, from the
government’s perspective, unsatisfactory because it concedes the impotence of the
sovereign to control unwanted migration and severely diminishes the return on
the public’s investment of billions of dollars in border control policy.
Second, the federal government might acknowledge that, as currently
constituted, the wall fails to prevent unlawful entry, but that this failure proves the
need for more extensive fencing. This option is economically and practically
unfeasible given the massive costs of walling the entire border. Moreover, this
strategy commits the government to the position that complete physical border
fortification is the most appropriate solution to unlawful migration. If that strategy
turns out to be only marginally more effective than partial fencing, the

litigation against the Arizona Legal Worker’s Act, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which would impose
heavy sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers).
204. Baud & van Schendel, supra note 95, at 227–29 (noting the Republic of Ireland/British
border in the late 1960s as an example of an unruly borderland; noting the borders between
China/Laos/Thailand/Burma, and the borders of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey with Kurdish populations as
examples of the rebellious borderland).
205. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 4, at 112 (“[B]order intensification and responses to them
render the border zone itself an increasingly violent space.”); War Without Borders, Mexican Drug
Trafficking (Mexico’s Drug War), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_trafficking/index.html?scp=1&sq=war%20
without%20borders&st=cse (detailing rise in violence at U.S.-Mexico border).
206. BROWN, supra note 4, at 84 (“This condition [of walls signaling the loss of nation-state
sovereignty’s a priori status] is evident in the fact that the new walls codify the conflicts to which they
respond as permanent and unwinnable.”); Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 73, at 743 (arguing that once
policies based on misinformation are enacted and stabilized, they may endure by influencing future
generations who will carry on the distortions that led to the creation of the initial policy).
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government has left the nation worse off than without the fence.
Third, the federal government could augment the wall with coercive force to
deter putative migrants. But, current research already shows that that fear of death
by crossing over unforgiving terrain does not deter border crossers.207 If
knowledge of the possibility of death during a crossing attempt does not turn
away putative migrants, one of the government’s only remaining border control
options would be to add the threat of intentional deadly force.208 But, backing up
the physical border barrier with lethal force would transform the U.S. and Mexico
wall into a massive Berlin Wall,209 a normatively despicable option wielded by
totalitarian states, for which neither the citizenry nor the lawmakers of the United
States have the stomach. Thus, by limiting government options, the deployment
of a physical border fortification strategy constrains subsequent sovereign decision
making and power in critical ways.
The claim that a border wall presages a decline in the importance of the
nation-state and/or handcuffs subsequent policy choices, however, is not to reject
the role of active choice and volition in the process. Although the wall possibly
marks the last vestiges of robust federal control over its borders, it marks the
crossroads not just of an imagined past of an omnipotent nation-state, but also a
moment at which the federal government might reassess its role in a globalized
world, where the supranational and the subnational are ascendant.210
By setting the nation down a path from which there are few opportunities to
freshly reconsider migration strategies, a border wall commits current and future
generations to regressive border policy. As Brown notes, walls tend to reproduce
inside exactly what they purport to exclude.211 Fundamentally, the wall is
anathema to the production of an individualized, freedom-seeking, and equally
dignified citizenry inside and outside of the nation.

207. See Cornelius, supra note 19.
208. See Fan, supra note 4, at 715 (quoting a rancher living near the Arizona-Mexico border,
“The Israeli wall was backed by guns; that’s why it worked in Israel, that’s how it worked in Berlin.
And I don’t agree with shooting people”).
209. The East-German soldiers stationed at the Berlin Wall had a standing “shoot to kill”
order for anyone who attempted to cross over to West-Berlin. It is believed that 125 people were
killed between 1961 and 1989 while attempting to flee East Berlin. Deanne Corbett, Researchers
Confirm 125 Berlin Wall Deaths, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 8, 2006), http://www.dw-world.de/
dw/article/0,,2125882,00.html.
210. Saskia Sassen, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION xii
(Columbia Univ. Press) (1996) (“I argue that globalization under these conditions has entailed a
partial denationalizing of national territory and a partial shift of some components of state sovereignty
to other institutions, from supranational entities to the global capital market.”) (emphasis added); see
also Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Strategic Site/New Frontier, 41 AM. STUDIES 79, 79–95 (2000).
211. BROWN, supra note 4, at 41 (“Thus, the kinds of subjects that Western nation-state walls
would block out are paradoxically produced within by the walls themselves—yet another way in
which walls inadvertently subvert the distinction between inside and outside that they are intended to
mark . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION
In his article Immigration Outside the Law, Hiroshi Motomura notes that one of
the difference between the majority and dissent in Plyler v. Doe (striking down state
law barring undocumented children from attending public elementary school) was
that that majority understood the unlawful presence of the children as the starting
point for analysis, while the dissent viewed their legal status as obviating any
further judicial attention.212 So too, here, the narrative of the border wall does not
end with evidence whether it eliminates migration or effectively deters unlawful
crossing. That debate is only the beginning of the analysis. The creation and
sustenance of the border wall is more nuanced and complex than conventional
diatribes by both supporters and critics would portray. The ability to eliminate
unlawful entry into the United States, or even significantly deter it, may have little
to do with the actual forces that compel the construction and maintenance of a
border fence. In short, sometimes a wall is more than just a wall.
This Article argues that the border wall alters migration discourse, law, and
enforcement in critical ways. It satiates an atavistic and primal need for security in
a turbulent global landscape. It provides comfort to the citizenry and tangibly
defines the “us” who should be protected from the “them” who must be kept
outside. Further, it helps simplify the legal consequences of unlawful entry,
translating complex immigration law violations into more easily understood
transgressions of domestic spatial relationships. Once constructed, the southern
border wall connects itself to an ancient tradition, subtly inscribing the notion that
borders are more than mere political, legal, and social constructs, but are natural
and primal lines between different peoples and cultures.
Ironically, however, the physical barrier at the southern border bespeaks a
sad and shallow national triumphalism. While the construction of a border wall
appears to be the nadir of national sovereign power, it also is a pyrrhic display,
obscuring for a moment the underlying truth that controlling human migration is
beyond the scope of any single nation-state. Thus, the U.S. border wall is yet
another harbinger of the decline of the saliency of the nation-state in the global
order. Many years hence, we will look upon it as the traveler once looked upon the
broken visage of Ozymandias:
I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: “Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown
And wrinkled lip and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed.

212.

Motomura, supra note 3.
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And on the pedestal these words appear:
‘My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings:
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!’
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away”.213

213. PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, Ozymandias, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF PERCY BYSSHE
SHELLEY 589 (1999) (1817).
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